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Investor Protection and Equity Markets

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  • Andrei Shleifer
  • Daniel Wolfenson

Abstract

We present a simple model of an entrepreneur going public in an environment with poor legal protection of outside shareholders. The model incorporates elements of Becker's (1968) crime and punishment' framework into a corporate finance environment of Jensen and Meckling (1976). We examine the entrepreneur's decision and the market equilibrium. The model is consistent with a number of empirical regularities concerning the relationship between investor protection and corporate finance.
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Suggested Citation

  • Andrei Shleifer & Daniel Wolfenson, 2000. "Investor Protection and Equity Markets," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1906, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:fth:harver:1906
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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