Obstacles to Optimal Policy: The Interplay of Politics and Economics in Shaping Bank Supervision and Regulation Reforms
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|Date of creation:||2000|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, CENTER FOR STUDY OF THE ECONOMY AND THE STATE, 1101 E. 58TH STREET CHICAGO ILLINOIS 60637.|
Web page: http://research.chicagobooth.edu/economy/
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