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La reputación técnica y el emprendimiento de políticas como fuente de poderes: el caso de la Fiscalía Nacional Económica

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  • Virginia Rivas

    (abogada)

Abstract

A través de dos recientes reformas legales (2009 y 2016), la Fiscalía Nacional Económica (FNE), agencia de la libre competencia de Chile, ha sido progresivamente investida de poderes inéditos para un órgano de la administración. Este artículo combina los enfoques de la teoría de la reputación y del emprendimiento de políticas públicas (policy entrepreneurship) para indagar en las razones por las cuales la Fiscalía ha recibido tales poderes, distanciándose de las tradicionales explicaciones basadas en la teoría del “agente-principal”. Se concluye que los planificados esfuerzos de la FNE para construir una reputación técnica y actuar como un emprendedor de políticas desempeñaron un rol relevante en el otorgamiento de los poderes regulatorios que le fueron concedidos en 2016. Sin embargo, las facultades recibidas en 2009 no podrían explicarse por los mismos factores. Consolidar una reputación institucional y un posicionamiento político requiere de mucho tiempo y trabajo. Para esta agencia, son activos aún frágiles y el camino para consolidarlos es incierto.

Suggested Citation

  • Virginia Rivas, 2018. "La reputación técnica y el emprendimiento de políticas como fuente de poderes: el caso de la Fiscalía Nacional Económica," Estudios Públicos, Centro de Estudios Públicos, vol. 0(152), pages 91-137.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpt:journl:v::y:2018:i:152:p:91-137
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • H39 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Other
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General

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