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Institutional Constraints and Organizational Changes : The Case of the British Rail Reform

Author

Listed:
  • Anne Yvrande-Billon

    () (ATOM - Analyse Théorique des Organisations et des Marchés - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne)

  • Claude Ménard

    () (ATOM - Analyse Théorique des Organisations et des Marchés - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne)

Abstract

This paper analyzes how institutional constraints determine organizational choices and investments decisions. More precisely, we examine how private parties adjust when policymakers impose a mode of organization with no or very little consideration for some major characteristics of the transactions that arrangement is intended to support. Our analysis uses original data related to the reform of the British rail industry. Notwithstanding their specific aspects, the problems raised by the radical transformation of this sector in the mid-1990s carry important lessons about what happens when a misaligned arrangement is implemented in a context that requires interfirm coordination.

Suggested Citation

  • Anne Yvrande-Billon & Claude Ménard, 2005. "Institutional Constraints and Organizational Changes : The Case of the British Rail Reform," Post-Print halshs-00273389, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00273389
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2004.05.002
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00273389
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Merkert, Rico, 2010. "Changes in transaction costs over time - The case of franchised train operating firms in Britain," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 52-59.
    2. Halkos, George, 2012. "Importance and influence of organizational changes on companies and their employees," MPRA Paper 36811, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Sharon Novak & Scott Stern, 2007. "How Does Outsourcing Affect Performance Dynamics? Evidence from the Automobile Industry," NBER Working Papers 13235, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. repec:hal:journl:halshs-01302684 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Alexandersson , Gunnar & Hultén, Staffan & Nilsson, Jan-Eric & Pyddoke, Roger, 2012. "The liberalization of railway passenger transport in Sweden – Outstanding regulatory challenges," Working papers in Transport Economics 2012:5, CTS - Centre for Transport Studies Stockholm (KTH and VTI).
    6. David Hergott & Florent Laroche & Patricia Perennes, 2014. "30 fiches pour comprendre les enjeux de la réforme ferroviaire," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01486732, HAL.
    7. Carmen A. Li & John Stittle, 2014. "Privatisation and Franchising of British Train Operations," Australian Accounting Review, CPA Australia, vol. 24(1), pages 53-65, March.
    8. Sharon Novak & Scott Stern, 2008. "How Does Outsourcing Affect Performance Dynamics? Evidence from the Automobile Industry," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(12), pages 1963-1979, December.
    9. Gianni De Fraja & Emanuela Michetti & Piercarlo Zanchettin, 2011. "Toc 'n' Roll: Bargaining, Service Quality and Specificity in the UK Railway Network," Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, University of Bath, vol. 45(3), pages 383-414, September.
    10. Albert Jolink & Eva Niesten, 2012. "Hybrid Governance," Chapters,in: Handbook on the Economics and Theory of the Firm, chapter 12 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    11. Marc Laperrouza, 2011. "Reforming Railways," Chapters,in: International Handbook of Network Industries, chapter 13 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    12. Asquer, Alberto, 2011. "Liberalization and regulatory reform of network industries: A comparative analysis of Italian public utilities," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 172-184.
    13. Alexandersson, Gunnar & Hulten, Staffan, 2006. "Competitive tenders in passenger railway services: Looking into the theory and practice of different approaches in Europe," European Transport \ Trasporti Europei, ISTIEE, Institute for the Study of Transport within the European Economic Integration, issue 33, pages 6-28.
    14. Merkert, Rico & Hensher, David A., 2014. "Open access for railways and transaction cost economics – Management perspectives of Australia's rail companies," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 227-236.
    15. repec:eee:crpeac:v:23:y:2012:i:2:p:153-167 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Preston, John, 2008. "A review of passenger rail franchising in Britain: 1996/1997-2006/2007," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 71-77, January.
    17. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00653090 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. repec:gam:jsusta:v:9:y:2017:i:10:p:1928-:d:116275 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Emeric Lendjel & Marianne Fischman, 2015. "Innovations in Barge Transport for Supplying French Urban Dense Areas: A Transaction Costs Approach," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01302684, HAL.
    20. Gwilliam, Ken, 2008. "A review of issues in transit economics," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 4-22, January.
    21. Merkert, Rico & Nash, Chris A., 2013. "Investigating European railway managers’ perception of transaction costs at the train operation/infrastructure interface," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 14-25.

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