Institutional constraints and organizational changes: the case of the British rail reform
This paper analyzes how institutional constraints determine organizational choices and investments decisions. More precisely, we examine how private parties adjust when policymakers impose a mode of organization with no or very little consideration for some major characteristics of the transactions that arrangement is intended to support. Our analysis uses original data related to the reform of the British rail industry. Notwithstanding their specific aspects, the problems raised by the radical transformation of this sector in the mid-1990s carry important lessons about what happens when a misaligned arrangement is implemented in a context that requires interfirm coordination.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Paul L. Joskow, 2002. "Transaction Cost Economics, Antitrust Rules, and Remedies," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 18(1), pages 95-116, April.
- Joskow, Paul L, 1991. "The Role of Transaction Cost Economics in Antitrust and Public Utility Regulatory Policies," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 53-83, Special I.
- Mariano Tommasi & Pablo T. Spiller, 2004. "The Institutions of Regulation," Working Papers 67, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Mar 2004.
- Peltzman, Sam, 1976.
"Toward a More General Theory of Regulation,"
Journal of Law and Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 211-240, August.
- Shelanski, Howard A & Klein, Peter G, 1995. "Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 335-361, October.
- Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743.
- Palay, Thomas M, 1985. "Avoiding Regulatory Constraints: Contracting Safeguards and the Role of Informal Agreements," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 155-175, Spring.
- Luisa Affuso & David Newbery, 2002. "The Impact of Structural and Contractual Arrangements on a Vertically Separated Railway," The Economic and Social Review, Economic and Social Studies, vol. 33(1), pages 83-92.
- Kirk Monteverde & David J. Teece, 1982. "Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 206-213, Spring.
- Witold J. Henisz, 2002. "The institutional environment for infrastructure investment," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 355-389.
- Crocker, K.J. & Masten, S.E., 1988.
"Pretia Ex Machina?: Prices And Process In Long-Term Contracts,"
10-88-2, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
- Crocker, Keith J & Masten, Scott E, 1991. "Pretia ex Machina? Prices and Process in Long-Term Contracts," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(1), pages 69-99, April.
- Riordan, Michael H. & Williamson, Oliver E., 1985. "Asset specificity and economic organization," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 365-378, December.
- Mark Armstrong & Simon Cowan & John Vickers, 1994. "Regulatory Reform: Economic Analysis and British Experience," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262510790.
- Paul L. Joskow, 1997. "Restructuring, Competition and Regulatory Reform in the U.S. Electricity Sector," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 119-138, Summer.
- Masten, Scott E, 1984. "The Organization of Production: Evidence from the Aerospace Industry," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(2), pages 403-417, October.
- Lyons, Bruce R., 1995. "Specific investment, economies of scale, and the make-or-buy decision: A test of transaction cost theory," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 431-443, May.
- Levy, Brian & Spiller, Pablo T, 1994. "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 201-246, October.
- McCubbins, Mathew D & Noll, Roger G & Weingast, Barry R, 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 243-277, Fall.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:56:y:2005:i:4:p:675-699. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Shamier, Wendy)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.