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The Impact of Structural and Contractual Arrangements on a Vertically Separated Railway

Author

Listed:
  • Luisa Affuso

    (London Business School)

  • David Newbery

    (University of Cambridge)

Abstract

The unbundling of railways in Britain has been heavily criticised as undermining the passenger rail system. Economic theory suggests that structural separation and short-lived contracts hinder incentives to invest in relation-specific assets. This paper consitutes an initial investigation of this proposition. It investigates whether the investment pattern of the rail passenger franchisees responds to structural and contractual characteristics using a unique panel of data on the privatised railways in Britain. Its findings suggest that unbundling and competition for franchises combined with commercial objectives can provide strong incentives towards better performance, as is the case for investment behaviour.

Suggested Citation

  • Luisa Affuso & David Newbery, 2002. "The Impact of Structural and Contractual Arrangements on a Vertically Separated Railway," The Economic and Social Review, Economic and Social Studies, vol. 33(1), pages 83-92.
    • Handle: RePEc:eso:journl:v:33:y:2002:i:1:p:83-92
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    File URL: http://www.esr.ie/vOL33_1Affuso.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    5. Andrew B. Abel & Janice C. Eberly, "undated". "An Exact Solution for the Investment and Market Value of a Firm Facing Uncertainty, Adjustment Costs, and Irreversibility," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 12-93, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
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    Cited by:

    1. Cherbonnier, Frédéric & Salant, David & Van Der Straeten, Karine, 2021. "Getting auctions for transportation capacity to roll," TSE Working Papers 21-1254, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    2. Link, Heike, 2016. "A Two-Stage Efficiency Analysis of Rail Passenger Franchising in Germany," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 50(1), pages 76-92.
    3. Freddy Huet & Simon Porcher, 2013. "Innovation and regulatory outcomes: evidence from the public-private contracts for water supply in France," Chapters, in: Mehmet Ugur (ed.), Governance, Regulation and Innovation, chapter 9, pages 216-236, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Abbott, Malcolm & Cohen, Bruce, 2016. "The privatization and de-privatization of rail industry assets in Australia and New Zealand," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 48-56.
    5. Emanuela Michetti, 2009. "Price and Quality Regulation in a Physical Network Industry," Department of Economics University of Siena 578, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
    6. Yvrande-Billon, Anne & Menard, Claude, 2005. "Institutional constraints and organizational changes: the case of the British rail reform," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(4), pages 675-699, April.
    7. Gianni De Fraja & Emanuela Michetti & Piercarlo Zanchettin, 2011. "Toc 'n' Roll: Bargaining, Service Quality and Specificity in the UK Railway Network," Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, University of Bath, vol. 45(3), pages 383-414, September.
    8. Nick Wills‐Johnson, 2008. "Separability and Subadditivity in Australian Railways," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 84(264), pages 95-108, March.
    9. Pittman, Russell, 2007. "Options for Restructuring the State-Owned Monopoly Railway," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 179-198, January.
    10. McCartney, Sean & Stittle, John, 2012. "‘Engines of Extravagance’: The privatised British railway rolling stock industry," CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 153-167.
    11. Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Calzolari, Giacomo, 2009. "Relational Contracts and Competitive Screening," CEPR Discussion Papers 7434, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Fumitoshi Mizutani & Shuji Uranishi, 2013. "Does vertical separation reduce cost? An empirical analysis of the rail industry in European and East Asian OECD Countries," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 43(1), pages 31-59, January.
    13. Link, Heike, 2019. "The impact of including service quality into efficiency analysis: The case of franchising regional rail passenger serves in Germany," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 284-300.

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