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Electoral competition and endogenous barriers to entry

Listed author(s):
  • Drometer, Marcus
  • Rincke, Johannes

As institutions matter for political and economic outcomes, they are (at least partly) shaped by the interests of political agents acting under these limitations. However, empirical evidence documenting such endogenous change of institutions is scarce. We address the issue by examining the link between the degree of electoral competition and the design of ballot access restrictions in the United States. Exploiting exogenous variation in electoral competition at the state level induced by the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965, our main finding is that ballot access rules have been systematically tightened in response to stronger electoral competition.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268014000147
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 34 (2014)
Issue (Month): C ()
Pages: 253-262

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Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:34:y:2014:i:c:p:253-262
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.02.003
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

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  1. Adam Martin & Diana Thomas, 2013. "Two-tiered political entrepreneurship and the congressional committee system," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 154(1), pages 21-37, January.
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  9. Daron Acemoglu, 2005. "Constitutions, Politics and Economics: A Review Essay on Persson and Tabellini's "The Economic Effect of Constitutions"," NBER Working Papers 11235, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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  13. Marcus Drometer & Johannes Rincke, 2009. "The impact of ballot access restrictions on electoral competition: evidence from a natural experiment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(3), pages 461-474, March.
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  17. repec:cup:apsrev:v:100:y:2006:i:03:p:403-417_06 is not listed on IDEAS
  18. Husted, Thomas A & Kenny, Lawrence W, 1997. "The Effect of the Expansion of the Voting Franchise on the Size of Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 54-82, February.
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