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The impact of ballot access restrictions on electoral competition: evidence from a natural experiment

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  • Marcus Drometer
  • Johannes Rincke

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Abstract

Measuring the effect of ballot access restrictions on electoral competition is compli- cated because the stringency of ballot access regulations cannot be treated as being exogenous to candidates' entry decisions. This paper exploits the 1968 U.S. Supreme Court decision to strike down Ohio's ballot access laws as a natural experiment to overcome the endogeneity problem. The evidence from difference-in-difference esti- mations suggests that the court decision and the accompanying sharp decrease in Ohio's petition requirements resulted in major parties facing a signifficant increase in competition from third party and independent candidates.
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Suggested Citation

  • Marcus Drometer & Johannes Rincke, 2009. "The impact of ballot access restrictions on electoral competition: evidence from a natural experiment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(3), pages 461-474, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:138:y:2009:i:3:p:461-474
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-008-9370-2
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-008-9370-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Philippe Aghion & Alberto Alesina & Francesco Trebbi, 2004. "Endogenous Political Institutions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 119(2), pages 565-611.
    2. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, January.
    3. Marcus Drometer & Johannes Rincke, 2008. "The design of political institutions: Electoral competition and the choice of ballot access restrictions in the United States," Working Papers 057, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE).
    4. Stratmann, Thomas, 2005. "Ballot access restrictions and candidate entry in elections," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 59-71, March.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Marcus Drometer & Johannes Rincke, 2008. "The design of political institutions: Electoral competition and the choice of ballot access restrictions in the United States," Working Papers 057, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE).
    2. Das, Sabyasachi & Mukhopadhyay, Abhiroop & Saroy, Rajas, 2017. "Efficiency Consequences of Affirmative Action in Politics: Evidence from India," IZA Discussion Papers 11093, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    3. Madiha Afzal, 2014. "Do barriers to candidacy reduce political competition? Evidence from a bachelor’s degree requirement for legislators in Pakistan," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 161(1), pages 51-72, October.
    4. Drometer, Marcus & Rincke, Johannes, 2014. "Electoral competition and endogenous barriers to entry," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 253-262.
    5. Daniel Lee, 2014. "Third-party threat and the dimensionality of major-party roll call voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(3), pages 515-531, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ballot access; Petition requirements; Electoral competition; Natural experiment; D72; D78;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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