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Transparency Gloves for Grabbing Hands? Politics and (Mis)Governance

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  • Blumkin, Tomer
  • Gradstein, Mark

Abstract

Employing the canonical political agency model, this Paper studies the incentives of the government to provide high-quality services by reducing corruption. Acting as a principal in a moral hazard framework, the public disciplines the incumbent by replacing him if the generated output is unsatisfactorily low. The implications of the model indicate the importance of transparency, of the media, and of political contestability for taming corruption. The existing empirical evidence is shown to broadly support these conclusions.

Suggested Citation

  • Blumkin, Tomer & Gradstein, Mark, 2002. "Transparency Gloves for Grabbing Hands? Politics and (Mis)Governance," CEPR Discussion Papers 3668, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3668
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Djankov, Simeon & et al, 2003. "Who Owns the Media?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 46(2), pages 341-381, October.
    2. Brunetti, Aymo & Weder, Beatrice, 2003. "A free press is bad news for corruption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1801-1824, August.
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    8. Fisman, Raymond & Gatti, Roberta, 2002. "Decentralization and corruption: evidence across countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(3), pages 325-345, March.
    9. repec:cup:apsrev:v:100:y:2006:i:01:p:115-131_06 is not listed on IDEAS
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    13. North, Douglass C. & Weingast, Barry R., 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(04), pages 803-832, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Albalate del Sol, 2013. "The institutional, economic and social determinants of local government transparency," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(1), pages 90-107, March.
    2. Kaufmann, Daniel & Bellver, Ana, 2005. "Transparenting Transparency: Intial Empirics and Policy Applications," MPRA Paper 8188, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    democracy; political corruption; transparency;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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