Colonialism, Elite Formation and Corruption
This paper argues that corruption in developing countries has deep historical roots; going all the way back to the characteristics of their colonial experience. The degree of European settlement during colonial times is used to dfferentiate between types of colonial experience, and is found to be a powerful explanatory factor of present-day corruption levels. The relationship is non-linear, as higher levels of European settlement resulted in more powerful elites (and more corruption) only as long as Europeans remained a minority group in the total population.
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- Elise Huillery, 2009.
"History Matters: The Long-Term Impact of Colonial Public Investments in French West Africa,"
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics,
American Economic Association, vol. 1(2), pages 176-215, April.
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"Aid Effectiveness: The Role of the Local Elite,"
2007_01, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow, revised Dec 2006.
- Luis Angeles & Kyriakos C. Neanidis, 2006. "Aid Effectiveness: The Role of the Local Elite," Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series 80, Economics, The Univeristy of Manchester.
- Luis Angeles & Kyriakos C. Neanidis, 2006. "Aid Effectiveness: The Role of the Local Elite," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0633, Economics, The University of Manchester.
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"Income Inequality and Colonialism,"
Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series
66, Economics, The Univeristy of Manchester.
- Anand Swamy & Stephen Knack & Young Lee & Omar Azfar, 2000.
"Gender and Corruption,"
Center for Development Economics
158, Department of Economics, Williams College.
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