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Institutions, property rights, and economic development in historical perspective

  • Luis Angeles

Institutions, and more specifically private property rights, have come to be seen as a major determinant of long-run economic develop- ment. We evaluate the case for property rights as an explanatory factor of the Industrial Revolution and derive some lessons for the analysis of developing countries today. We pay particular attention to the role of property rights in the accumulation of physical capital and the pro- duction of new ideas. The evidence that we review from the economic history literature does not support the institutional thesis.

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Paper provided by Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow in its series Working Papers with number 2011_03.

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Date of creation: Feb 2011
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Handle: RePEc:gla:glaewp:2011_03
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  3. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2001. "Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution," NBER Working Papers 8460, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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  7. Mauricio Drelichman & Joachim Voth, 2011. "Serial defaults, serial profits: Returns to sovereign lending in Habsburg Spain, 1566-1600," Economics Working Papers 1262, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  8. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2009. "This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 8973, March.
  9. Dincecco, Mark, 2009. "Fiscal Centralization, Limited Government, and Public Revenues in Europe, 1650–1913," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 69(01), pages 48-103, March.
  10. Angeles, Luis & Neanidisy, Kyriakos C., 2010. "Colonialism, Elite Formation and Corruption," SIRE Discussion Papers 2010-51, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
  11. Paul Romer, 1989. "Endogenous Technological Change," NBER Working Papers 3210, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Luis Angeles, 2005. "Income Inequality and Colonialism," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0543, Economics, The University of Manchester.
  13. William Easterly & Ross Levine, 2002. "Tropics, Germs, and Crops: How Endowments Influence Economic Development," Working Papers 15, Center for Global Development.
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  15. Parello, Carmelo Pierpaolo, 2008. "A north-south model of intellectual property rights protection and skill accumulation," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(1-2), pages 253-281, February.
  16. Luis Angeles & Kyriakos C. Neanidis, 2006. "Aid Effectiveness: The Role of the Local Elite," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0633, Economics, The University of Manchester.
  17. Martin Paldam & Erich Gundlach, 2007. "Two Views on Institutions and Development: The Grand Transition vs the Primacy of Institutions," Economics Working Papers 2007-02, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
  18. Dinopoulos, Elias & Segerstrom, Paul, 2010. "Intellectual property rights, multinational firms and economic growth," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(1), pages 13-27, May.
  19. Quinn, Stephen, 2001. "The Glorious Revolution'S Effect On English Private Finance: A Microhistory, 1680 1705," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 61(03), pages 593-615, September.
  20. Lai, Edwin L. -C. & Qiu, Larry D., 2003. "The North's intellectual property rights standard for the South?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 183-209, January.
  21. Angeles, Luis, 2010. "Institutions and Economic Development. New tests and new doubts," SIRE Discussion Papers 2010-75, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
  22. Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, 1995. "Institutions And Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(3), pages 207-227, November.
  23. Angeles Luis, 2005. "Should Developing Countries Strengthen their Intellectual Property Rights?," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 1-25, November.
  24. Abhijit Banerjee & Lakshmi Iyer, 2010. "History Institutions and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India," Working Papers id:2811, eSocialSciences.
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  26. James Conklin, 1998. "The Theory of Sovereign Debt and Spain under Philip II," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(3), pages 483-513, June.
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