Patents, appropriate technology, and North-South trade
In this paper, the authors discuss the possibility that the North and South may have differing technological needs. Just as the North would like to develop drugs against cancer and heart disease, and the South drugs against tropical disease, so the North's labor saving innovations are less useful in the South, where labor is cheap. Southern patents might promote the development of technologies appropriate to the South that might not have been developed if there were no patents. In this case, lower patent protection in the South would not benefit the South and increased patent protection in the South can hurt the North when the resources to go into R&D are limited. The authors develop a formal model for inteellectual property rights, emphasizing the dimension of technological choice. This model allows for a continuum of potential technologies, with a range of preferences in the North and South; free entry in the R&D sector rather than duopolistic competition; and gradations of patent protection. The report concludes by reviewing the results of the analysis.
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- Deolalikar, Anil B & Roller, Lars-Hendrik, 1989. "Patenting by Manufacturing Firms in India: Its Production and Impact," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(3), pages 303-314, March.
- Jaffe, Adam B, 1986.
"Technological Opportunity and Spillovers of R&D: Evidence from Firms' Patents, Profits, and Market Value,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 76(5), pages 984-1001, December.
- Adam B. Jaffe, 1986. "Technological Opportunity and Spillovers of R&D: Evidence from Firms' Patents, Profits and Market Value," NBER Working Papers 1815, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Colleen Hamilton & John Whalley, 1988. "Coalitions in the Uruguay Round: The Extent, Pros and Cons of Developing Country Participation 1,2," NBER Working Papers 2751, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- John Whalley, 1989. "Coalitions in the Uruguay round," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 125(3), pages 547-562, September.
- Dasgupta, Partha, 1988. "Patents, Priority and Imitation or, the Economics of Races and Waiting Games," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 98(389), pages 66-80, March.
- Robert P. Benko, 1988. "Intellectual Property Rights and the Uruguay Round," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(2), pages 217-232, 06. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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