A theory of institutional legitimacy
Institutions matter: they affect individual action, influence cooperation and are crucial in making the difference between wealth and poverty, growth and stagnation. Yet, the explanatory power of modern institutional economics has not been exceedingly satisfactory. This paper criticizes the mainstream institutional view and maintains that its key weakness consists in its consequentialist nature. In contrast with the traditional perspective, therefore, we suggest a theory of institutional dynamics based on the notions of justice, social and procedural legitimacy and fairness. In particular, we put forward a stylized model of society, which includes two groups of individuals: the socialists and the libertarians. We discuss under which conditions they are likely to cooperate, when instability emerges and when demand for institutional change builds up. Finally, we draw on these insights in order to articulate a new research agenda for institutional economics.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +39 011 6706060
Fax: +39 011 6706062
Web page: http://www.esomas.unito.it/Email:
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Berggren, Niclas, 2003. "The Benefits of Economic Freedom: A Survey," Ratio Working Papers 4, The Ratio Institute.
- Berggren, Niclas & Bergh, Andreas & Bjørnskov, Christian, 2009.
"The growth effects of institutional instability,"
2009:8, Lund University, Department of Economics.
- Luis Angeles, 2011.
"Institutions, Property Rights, and Economic Development in Historical Perspective,"
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(2), pages 157-177, 05.
- Angeles, Luis, 2011. "Institutions, Property Rights, and Economic Development in Historical Perspective," SIRE Discussion Papers 2011-08, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
- Luis Angeles, 2011. "Institutions, property rights, and economic development in historical perspective," Working Papers 2011_03, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
- Andreas Bergh & Christian Bjørnskov, 2011. "Historical Trust Levels Predict the Current Size of the Welfare State," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(1), pages 1-19, 02.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:icr:wpicer:05-2012. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Simone Pellegrino)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.