Innovation, Imitation and intellectual Property Rights
The debate between the North and the South about the enforcement of intellectual property rights is examined within a dynamic general equilibrium framework in which the North invents new products and the South imitates them. A welfare evaluation of a policy of tighter intellectual property rights is provided by decomposing its response into four items: (1) terms of trade; (2) production composition; (3) available products; and (4) intertemporal allocation of consumption The paper proceeds in stages. It begins with an exogenous rate of innovation in order to focus on the first two elements. The following two components are added by endogenizing the rate of innovation. Finally, foreign direct investment is added to the model. Copyright 1993 by The Econometric Society.
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- Keith Maskus, 1998. "The international regulation of intellectual property," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 134(2), pages 186-208, June.
- Mansfield, Edwin & Schwartz, Mark & Wagner, Samuel, 1981. "Imitation Costs and Patents: An Empirical Study," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 91(364), pages 907-918, December.
- Feinberg, Robert M & Rousslang, Donald J, 1990. "The Economic Effects of Intellectual Property Right Infringements," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63(1), pages 79-90, January.
- Deardorff, Alan V, 1992. "Welfare Effects of Global Patent Protection," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 59(233), pages 35-51, February.
- Ishac Diwan & Dani Rodrik, 1989.
"Patents, Appropriate Technology, and North-South Trade,"
NBER Working Papers
2974, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Diwan, Ishac & Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Patents, appropriate technology, and North-South trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1-2), pages 27-47, February.
- Diwan, Ishac & Rodrik, Dani, 1989. "Patents, appropriate technology, and North-South trade," Policy Research Working Paper Series 251, The World Bank.
- Diamond, Peter A., 1980. "An alternative to steady-state comparisons," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 7-9.
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