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The Political Economy of Early COVID-19 Interventions in US States

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  • Niepelt, Dirk
  • Gonzalez-Eiras, Martin

Abstract

We investigate how politico-economic factors shaped government responses to the spread of COVID-19. Our simple framework uses epidemiological, economic and politico-economic arguments. Confronting the theory with US state level data we find strong evidence for partisanship even when we control for fundamentals including the electorate's political views. Moreover, we detect an important role for the proximity of elections which we interpret as indicative of career concerns. Finally, we find suggestive evidence for complementarities between voluntary activity reductions and government imposed restrictions.

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  • Niepelt, Dirk & Gonzalez-Eiras, Martin, 2022. "The Political Economy of Early COVID-19 Interventions in US States," CEPR Discussion Papers 16906, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:16906
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    Cited by:

    1. Daryna Grechyna, 2023. "Elections and Policies: Evidence from the Covid Pandemic," CESifo Working Paper Series 10544, CESifo.
    2. Wang, Zongrun & Zhou, Ling & Mi, Yunlong & Shi, Yong, 2022. "Measuring dynamic pandemic-related policy effects: A time-varying parameter multi-level dynamic factor model approach," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
    3. Besley, Timothy & Dray, Sacha, 2023. "The political economy of lockdown: Does free media matter?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    4. Ren, He & Zheng, Yi, 2023. "COVID-19 vaccination and household savings: An economic recovery channel," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    5. Mart n Gonzales-Eiras, Dirk Niepelt, 2023. "Optimal Epidemic Control," Diskussionsschriften dp2311, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    6. Lee, Sang Yoon(Tim), 2022. "The political economy of early COVID-19 interventions in U.S. states: Comment," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 140(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Covid-19; Lockdown; Politics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

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