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Self-enforcing norms and efficient non-cooperative collective action in the provision of public goods

  • Kai Konrad

    ()

  • Wolfgang Leininger

    ()

No abstract is available for this item.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-010-9600-2
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 146 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 (March)
Pages: 501-520

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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:146:y:2011:i:3:p:501-520
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

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  1. Kaplan, T.R. & Luski, I. & Wettstein, D., 2000. "Innovative Activity and Sunk Cost," Papers 2000-6, Tel Aviv.
  2. Kai A. Konrad & Wolfgang Leininger, 2005. "The Generalized Stackelberg Equilibrium of the All-Pay Auction with Complete Information," CESifo Working Paper Series 1609, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. de Meza, David & Gould, J R, 1992. "The Social Efficiency of Private Decisions to Enforce Property Rights," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 561-80, June.
  4. Peter T. Leeson, 2007. "Trading with Bandits," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50, pages 303-321.
  5. Peter Leeson, 2008. "Coordination without command: Stretching the scope of spontaneous order," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 135(1), pages 67-78, April.
  6. Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2007. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Handbook of Defense Economics, Elsevier.
  7. Powell, Benjamin & Stringham, Edward, 2009. "Public choice and the economic analysis of anarchy: a survey," MPRA Paper 26097, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Cornes, Richard, 1993. "Dyke Maintenance and Other Stories: Some Neglected Types of Public Goods," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(1), pages 259-71, February.
  9. Konrad, Kai A. & Leininger, Wolfgang, 2007. "The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information," Munich Reprints in Economics 22092, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  10. Grossman, Herschel I, 1994. "Production, Appropriation, and Land Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 705-12, June.
  11. Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February.
  12. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson & Thierry Verdier, 2003. "Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule," NBER Working Papers 10136, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Ling Shen, 2007. "When will a Dictator be Good?," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 343-366, May.
  14. Fearon, James D., 1995. "Rationalist explanations for war," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(03), pages 379-414, June.
  15. Bagwell, Laurie Simon & Bernheim, B Douglas, 1996. "Veblen Effects in a Theory of Conspicuous Consumption," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 349-73, June.
  16. Spolaore, Enrico & Alesina, Alberto, 2005. "War, Peace, and the Size of Countries," Scholarly Articles 4553002, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  17. Yoram Barzel, 2000. "Property rights and the evolution of the state," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 25-51, 03.
  18. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1991. "Collective Rent Dissipation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(409), pages 1522-34, November.
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