Warlords complete for turf that provides them with rents and "taxable" resources while also providing a semblance of security within their respective territories. Because such competition takes place through the use of force or the threat of the use of force, more competition can lead to lower welfare as resources are wasted on unproductive arming and fighting. Rents crowd out production, in some cases almost cmpletely so.
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|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA IRVINE, SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, IRVINECALIFORNIA 91717 U.S.A.|
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- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
- E23 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Production
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- Halvor Mehlum & Karl Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2006.
"Institutions and the Resource Curse,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(508), pages 1-20, 01.
- Halvor Mehlum & Karl Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2002. "Institutions and the resource curse," GE, Growth, Math methods 0210004, EconWPA.
- Mehlum, Halvor & Moene, Karl-Ove & Torvik, Ragnar, 2003. "Institutions and the resource curse," Memorandum 29/2002, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Halvor Mehlum & Karl Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2002. "Institutions and the resource curse," Development and Comp Systems 0210003, EconWPA.
- Halvor Mehlum & Karl Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2004. "Institutions and the Resource Curse," DEGIT Conference Papers c009_012, DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade.
- Seabright, Paul, 2008. "Warfare and the Multiple Adoption of Agriculture After the Last Ice Age," IDEI Working Papers 522, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Syed Mansoob Murshed, 2007. "The conflict-growth nexus and the poverty of nations," Working Papers 43, United Nations, Department of Economics and Social Affairs.
- Halvor Mehlum & Karl Ove Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2002. "Plunder & Protection Inc," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 39(4), pages 447-459, July.
- Halvor Mehlum & Karl Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2002. "Plunder & Protection Inc," Development and Comp Systems 0210002, EconWPA.
- Mehlum, Halvor & Moene, Karl-Ove & Torvik, Ragnar, 2003. "Plunder & Protections Inc," Memorandum 10/2002, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- repec:zbw:rwirep:0016 is not listed on IDEAS
- Ola Olsson & Heather Congdon Fors, 2004. "Congo: The Prize of Predation," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 41(3), pages 321-336, May.
- Olsson, Ola & Congdon, Heather, 2003. "Congo: The Prize of Predation," Working Papers in Economics 97, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics, revised 30 Oct 2003.
- Konrad, Kai A. & Leininger, Wolfgang, 2007. "Self-enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-cooperative Organization of Clans," Ruhr Economic Papers 16, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
- Konrad, Kai A. & Leininger, Wolfgang, 2007. "Self-enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-cooperative Organization of Clans," CEPR Discussion Papers 6333, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Kai A. Konrad & Wolfgang Leininger, 2007. "Self-enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-cooperative Organization of Clans," Ruhr Economic Papers 0016, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
- Konrad, Kai A., 2007. "Strategy in contests: an introduction
[Strategie in Turnieren – eine Einführung]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2007-01, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- Attiat F. Ott & Sang Hoo Bae, 2011. "Modeling Mass Killing: For Gain or Ethnic Cleansing?," Chapters,in: Handbook on the Economics of Conflict, chapter 4 Edward Elgar Publishing.
- van Besouw, Bram & Ansink, Erik & van Bavel, Bas, 2016. "The economics of violence in natural states," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 132(PA), pages 139-156.
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