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Aggressive elites and vulnerable entrepreneurs - trust and cooperation in the shadow of conflict

  • Mehlum, Halvor

    ()

    (Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo)

  • Ove Moene, Karl

    ()

    (Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo)

We explore the implications of having a divided society where group leaders have motives for aggression towards other groups but where entrepreneurs have a desire for cooperation and peace. We assert that it is members of the elites who start conflicts and wage wars while the entrepreneurs undertake the type of economic activities that they find most profitable given the circumstances. We derive implications for peace and conflict. We find conflict induced poverty traps with self-fulfilling expectations about conflict and we derive implications for peace building strategies.

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File URL: https://www.sv.uio.no/econ/english/research/unpublished-works/working-papers/pdf-files/2010/Memo-16-2010.pdf
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Paper provided by Oslo University, Department of Economics in its series Memorandum with number 16/2010.

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Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: 03 Jan 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:osloec:2010_016
Contact details of provider: Postal: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
Phone: 22 85 51 27
Fax: 22 85 50 35
Web page: http://www.oekonomi.uio.no/indexe.html
Email:


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  1. Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2009. "International Trade and Transnational Insecurity: How Comparative Advantage and Power are Jointly Determined," Working Papers 080921, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
  2. Azam, Jean-Paul & Mesnard, Alice, 2003. " Civil War and the Social Contract," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 115(3-4), pages 455-75, June.
  3. Halvor Mehlum & Karl Moene, 2002. "Battlefields and Marketplaces," Development and Comp Systems 0210001, EconWPA.
  4. Chung, Tai-Yeong, 1995. "On Strategic Commitment: Contracting versus Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 437-41, May.
  5. James E. Anderson & Douglas Marcouiller, 2002. "Insecurity And The Pattern Of Trade: An Empirical Investigation," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 84(2), pages 342-352, May.
  6. Martin, Philippe & Mayer, Thierry & Thoenig, Mathias, 2005. "Make trade not war ?," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Docweb) 0515, CEPREMAP.
  7. Dani Rodrik, 1989. "Policy Uncertainty and Private Investment in Developing Countries," NBER Working Papers 2999, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Skaperdas, S. & Syropoulos, C., 2000. "Guns, Butter, and Openness: On The Relationship Between Security and Trade," Papers 00-01-23, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
  9. Sule Ozler & Dani Rodrik, 1992. "External Shocks, Politics and Private Investment: Some Theory and Empirical Evidence," NBER Working Papers 3960, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Stergios Skaperdas & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2002. "Insecure Property and the Efficiency of Exchange," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(476), pages 133-146, January.
  11. Torvik, Ragnar, 2002. "Natural resources, rent seeking and welfare," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 455-470, April.
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