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Aggressive elites and vulnerable entrepreneurs - trust and cooperation in the shadow of conflict

Author

Listed:
  • Mehlum, Halvor

    () (Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo)

  • Ove Moene, Karl

    () (Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo)

Abstract

We explore the implications of having a divided society where group leaders have motives for aggression towards other groups but where entrepreneurs have a desire for cooperation and peace. We assert that it is members of the elites who start conflicts and wage wars while the entrepreneurs undertake the type of economic activities that they find most profitable given the circumstances. We derive implications for peace and conflict. We find conflict induced poverty traps with self-fulfilling expectations about conflict and we derive implications for peace building strategies.

Suggested Citation

  • Mehlum, Halvor & Ove Moene, Karl, 2011. "Aggressive elites and vulnerable entrepreneurs - trust and cooperation in the shadow of conflict," Memorandum 16/2010, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:osloec:2010_016
    as

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    File URL: https://www.sv.uio.no/econ/english/research/unpublished-works/working-papers/pdf-files/2010/Memo-16-2010.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ozler, Sule & Rodrik, Dani, 1992. "External shocks, politics and private investment : Some theory and empirical evidence," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 141-162, July.
    2. Halvor Mehlum & Karl Moene, 2002. "Battlefields and marketplaces," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(6), pages 485-496.
    3. Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Policy uncertainty and private investment in developing countries," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 229-242, October.
    4. repec:cup:apsrev:v:97:y:2003:i:01:p:123-133_00 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2009. "International Trade and Transnational Insecurity: How Comparative Advantage and Power are Jointly Determined," CESifo Working Paper Series 2680, CESifo Group Munich.
    6. Philippe Martin & Thierry Mayer & Mathias Thoenig, 2008. "Make Trade Not War?," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(3), pages 865-900.
    7. James E. Anderson & Douglas Marcouiller, 2002. "Insecurity And The Pattern Of Trade: An Empirical Investigation," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 84(2), pages 342-352, May.
    8. Stergios Skaperdas & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2001. "Guns, Butter, and Openness: On the Relationship between Security and Trade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 353-357, May.
    9. Torvik, Ragnar, 2002. "Natural resources, rent seeking and welfare," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 455-470, April.
    10. Stergios Skaperdas & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2002. "Insecure Property and the Efficiency of Exchange," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(476), pages 133-146, January.
    11. Azam, Jean-Paul & Mesnard, Alice, 2003. "Civil War and the Social Contract," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 115(3-4), pages 455-475, June.
    12. Chung, Tai-Yeong, 1995. "On Strategic Commitment: Contracting versus Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 437-441, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Conflict; investments; trust; cooperation;

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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