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Allies as rivals: internal and external rent seeking

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  • Glazer, Amihai

Abstract

A Manager of other leader can more effectively obtain rents or other benefits for his organization the higher the quality of his staff. But these same staff may seek rents within the firm, with the most able staff best able to do so. A Manager may therefore prefer to employ staff of low quality.
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Suggested Citation

  • Glazer, Amihai, 2002. "Allies as rivals: internal and external rent seeking," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 155-162, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:48:y:2002:i:2:p:155-162
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Milgrom, Paul R, 1988. "Employment Contracts, Influence Activities, and Efficient Organization Design," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 42-60, February.
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    3. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 2001. "The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory of the Origins and Growth of Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 116(3), pages 805-851.
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    5. Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas, 2000. "Contract or War? On the Consequences of a Broader View of Self-Interest in Economics," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 44(1), pages 5-16, March.
    6. Stergios Skaperdas, 1996. "Contest success functions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
    7. Skaperdas, Stergios & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 1997. "The Distribution of Income in the Presence of Appropriative Activities," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 64(253), pages 101-117, February.
    8. Wintrobe,Ronald, 1998. "The Political Economy of Dictatorship," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521583299, April.
    9. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dasgupta, Indraneel, 2009. "'Living' wage, class conflict and ethnic strife," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 750-765, November.
    2. Wagner, Alexander F, 2011. "Relational contracts when the agent's productivity inside the relationship is correlated with outside opportunities," CEPR Discussion Papers 8378, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Kai A. Konrad & Wolfgang Leininger, 2007. "Self-enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-cooperative Organization of Clans," Ruhr Economic Papers 0016, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    4. Dieter Bös, 2002. "Contests Among Bureaucrats," CESifo Working Paper Series 807, CESifo Group Munich.
    5. Holian Matthew J., 2011. "Understanding the M-form Hypothesis," Journal of Industrial Organization Education, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 1-10, March.
    6. Jay Pil Choi & Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Jaesoo Kim, 2011. "Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series 025, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    7. Münster, Johannes & Staal, Klaas, 2005. "War with Outsiders Makes Peace Inside," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 75, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    8. Dieter Bös, 2002. "Contests Among Bureaucrats," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse27_2002, University of Bonn, Germany.
    9. Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2011. "Dictators And Their Viziers: Endogenizing The Loyalty–Competence Trade‐Off," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 9(5), pages 903-930, October.
    10. Johannes Münster & Klaas Staal, 2012. "How organizational structure can reduce rent-seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 579-594, March.
    11. repec:zbw:rwirep:0016 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Elie Appelbaum, 2006. "Strategic extremism," Working Papers 2006_12, York University, Department of Economics.
    13. Konstantin Sonin & Georgy Egorov, 2011. "Incumbency Advantage in Nondemocratic Elections," 2011 Meeting Papers 417, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    14. Konrad, Kai A. & Leininger, Wolfgang, 2007. "Self-enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-cooperative Organization of Clans," Ruhr Economic Papers 16, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • M10 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - General
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation

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