Allies as rivals: internal and external rent seeking
A Manager of other leader can more effectively obtain rents or other benefits for his organization the higher the quality of his staff. But these same staff may seek rents within the firm, with the most able staff best able to do so. A Manager may therefore prefer to employ staff of low quality.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ronald Wintrobe, 2001.
"How to understand, and deal with dictatorship: an economist's view,"
Economics of Governance,
Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 35-58, 03.
- Ronald Wintrobe, 2001. "How to understand, and deal with dictatorship: an economist's view," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 35-58, 03.
- Garfinkel, M.R. & Skaperdas, S., 2000.
"Contract or War? On the Consequences of a Broader View of Self-Interest in Economics,"
99-00-12, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
- Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas, 2000. "Contract or War? On the Consequences of a Broader View of Self-Interest in Economics," The American Economist, Omicron Delta Epsilon, vol. 44(1), pages 5-16, March.
- Wintrobe,Ronald, 1998. "The Political Economy of Dictatorship," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521583299, Junio.
- Skaperdas, Stergios, 1996.
"Contest Success Functions,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 283-90, February.
- Milgrom, Paul R., 1987.
"employment contracts, influence activities and efficient organization design,"
Department of Economics, Working Paper Series
qt6pf6c5j6, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Milgrom, Paul R, 1988. "Employment Contracts, Influence Activities, and Efficient Organization Design," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 42-60, February.
- Paul R. Milgrom., 1987. "Employment Contracts, Influence Activities and Efficient Organization Design," Economics Working Papers 8741, University of California at Berkeley.
- Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
- Carmichael, H Lorne, 1988. "Incentives in Academics: Why Is There Tenure?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(3), pages 453-72, June.
- Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 2000.
"The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory of the Origin and Growth of Firms,"
NBER Working Papers
7546, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 2001. "The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory of the Origins and Growth of Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 116(3), pages 805-851.
- Skaperdas, Stergios & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 1997. "The Distribution of Income in the Presence of Appropriative Activities," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 64(253), pages 101-17, February.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:48:y:2002:i:2:p:155-162. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Shamier, Wendy)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.