The Dictator’s Dilemma: to Punish or to Assist? Plan Failures and Interventions under Stalin
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DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.269765
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- Markevich, Andrei, 2007. "The Dictator’s Dilemma : to Punish or to Assist? Plan Failures and Interventions under Stalin," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 816, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Andrei Markevich, 2007. "The Dictator’s Dilemma: to Punish or to Assist? Plan Failures and Interventions under Stalin," Working Papers w0107, New Economic School (NES).
- Andrei Markevich, 2007. "The Dictator’s Dilemma: to Punish or to Assist? Plan Failures and Interventions under Stalin," Working Papers w0107, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
References listed on IDEAS
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- Markevich, Andrei, 2007. "How Much Control is Enough? Monitoring and Enforcement under Stalin," Economic Research Papers 269778, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Andrei Markevich, 2011.
"How Much Control is Enough? Monitoring and Enforcement under Stalin,"
Europe-Asia Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 63(8), pages 1449-1468.
- Andrei Markevich, 2007. "How Much Control is Enough? Monitoring and Enforcement under Stalin," Working Papers w0110, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
- Andrei Markevich, 2007. "How Much Control is Enough? Monitoring and Enforcement under Stalin," Working Papers w0110, New Economic School (NES).
- Markevich, Andrei, 2007. "How Much Control is Enough? Monitoring and Enforcement under Stalin," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 829, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Markevich, Andrei, 2007. "How Much Control is Enough? Monitoring and Enforcement under Stalin," Economic Research Papers 269778, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Harrison, Mark & Markevich, Andrei, 2007.
"Quantity Versus Quality in the Soviet Market for Weapons,"
Economic Research Papers
269771, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Mark Harrison & Andrei Markevich, 2007. "Quantity Versus Quality in the Soviet Market for Weapons," Working Papers w0109, New Economic School (NES).
- Harrison, Mark & Markevich, Andrei, 2007. "Quantity Versus Quality in the Soviet Market for Weapons," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 822, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Mark Harrison & Andrei Markevich, 2007. "Quantity Versus Quality in the Soviet Market for Weapons," Working Papers w0109, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
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More about this item
Keywords
Agricultural and Food Policy; Political Economy;JEL classification:
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights
- N44 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: 1913-
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