Quality, experience, and monopoly: the Soviet market for weapons under Stalin -super-1
Monopoly is a particular problem in markets where experience goods are traded, since the consumer cannot respond to bad experiences by switching repeat purchases to another supplier. New evidence shows how the defence ministry as buyer in the Soviet market for military goods responded to this problem by investing in an evaluation of quality prior to purchase, by showing reluctance to buy, and by exploiting the available non-market means to influence the defence industry as supplier. The effectiveness of these stratagems was limited by the defence industry's counteractions and because the buyer had no choice but to come to a compromise with the supplier. Copyright Economic History Society 2005.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 59 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (02)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0013-0117|
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0013-0117|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Gregory,Paul R., 1990. "Restructuring the Soviet Economic Bureaucracy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521363860, February.
- Schmitz, Patrick W, 2001.
"The Hold-up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory,"
Bulletin of Economic Research,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1), pages 1-17, January.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," MPRA Paper 12562, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Mark Harrison, 2001. "Soviet industry and the red army under stalin : a military-industrial complex?," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 609, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Gordon, Robert J, 1969. "$45 Billion of U.S. Private Investment Has Been Mislaid," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(3), pages 221-238, June.
- Valery Lazarev & Paul R. Gregory, 2002. "The wheels of a command economy: allocating Soviet vehicles[Research f]," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 55(2), pages 324-348, 05.
- William P. Rogerson, 1994. "Economic Incentives and the Defense Procurement Process," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(4), pages 65-90, Fall.
- Victor P. Goldberg, 1976. "Regulation and Administered Contracts," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(2), pages 426-448, Autumn. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)