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How Much Control is Enough? Monitoring and Enforcement under Stalin

Author

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  • Andrei Markevich

Abstract

The article examines the control system that Stalin established to enforce his orders. Historical records demonstrate that Stalin designed the system's scope, organisation and credentials to maximise its cost-effectiveness. On several occasions Stalin deliberately limited the system's size and stimulated whistle-blowing in an attempt to mitigate running costs. In contrast, distorted preferences and constraints on inspectors’ loyalty contributed to the multiplication of the number of monitoring agencies. Because his orders were incomplete, Stalin authorised his inspectors not only to monitor, but also to intervene in operational matters wherever necessary.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrei Markevich, 2011. "How Much Control is Enough? Monitoring and Enforcement under Stalin," Europe-Asia Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 63(8), pages 1449-1468.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:ceasxx:v:63:y:2011:i:8:p:1449-1468
    DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2011.601116
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Harrison, Mark, "undated". "Fact and Fantasy in Soviet Records: The Documentation of Soviet Party and Secret Police Investigations as Historical Evidence," Economic Research Papers 269715, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    2. Mark Harrison, 2013. "Secrecy, Fear and Transaction Costs: The Business of Soviet Forced Labour in the Early Cold War," Europe-Asia Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 65(6), pages 1112-1135.
    3. Harrison, Mark, "undated". "Secrecy and State Capacity: A Look Behind the Iron Curtain," Economic Research Papers 269312, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    4. Mark Harrison & Inga Zaksauskienė, 2016. "Counter-intelligence in a command economy," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 69(1), pages 131-158, February.
    5. Harrison, Mark, "undated". "Forging Success : Soviet Managers and False Accounting, 1943 to 1962," Economic Research Papers 271291, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    6. Andrei Markevich, 2007. "The Dictator’s Dilemma: to Punish or to Assist? Plan Failures and Interventions under Stalin," Working Papers w0107, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
    7. Miller, Marcus & Smith, Jennifer C., 2015. "In the shadow of the Gulag: Worker discipline under Stalin," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 531-548.
    8. Harrison, Mark, "undated". "Whistleblower or Troublemaker? How One Man Took on the Soviet Mafia," Economic Research Papers 271309, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    9. Harrison, Mark, 2011. "Forging success: Soviet managers and accounting fraud, 1943-1962," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 43-64, March.
    10. Harrison, Mark, 2013. "The Economics of Coercion and Conflict: an Introduction," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 151, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    11. repec:cge:wacage:2018 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • P21 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Planning, Coordination, and Reform
    • N44 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: 1913-

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