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The Economics of Coercion and Conflict: an Introduction

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  • Harrison, Mark

    (University of Warwick)

Abstract

This chapter introduces the author’s selected papers on the economics of coercion and conflict. It defines coercion and conflict and relates them. In conflict, adversaries make costly investments in the means of coercion. The application of coercion does not remove choice but limits it to options that leave the victim worse off than before. Coercion and conflict are always political, but a number of key concepts from economics can help us understand them. These include rational choice, strategic interaction, increasing and diminishing returns, scale and state capacity, surplus extraction, and Type I errors. The chapter concludes that the economist’s toolkit, although not complete, is useful.

Suggested Citation

  • Harrison, Mark, 2013. "The Economics of Coercion and Conflict: an Introduction," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 151, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cge:wacage:151
    as

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    File URL: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/centres/cage/manage/publications/151-2013_harrison.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mark Harrison & Nikolaus Wolf, 2014. "The Frequency of Wars," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: THE ECONOMICS OF COERCION AND CONFLICT, chapter 5, pages 121-149, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2009. "The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1218-1244, September.
    3. Andrei Markevich, 2011. "How Much Control is Enough? Monitoring and Enforcement under Stalin," Europe-Asia Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 63(8), pages 1449-1468.
    4. Greif,Avner, 2006. "Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521480444.
    5. Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Skaperdas, Stergios & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 2015. "Trade and insecure resources," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 98-114.
    6. Fearon, James D., 1995. "Rationalist explanations for war," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(3), pages 379-414, July.
    7. Brennan, Geoffrey & Tullock, Gordon, 1982. "An economic theory of military tactics : Methodological individualism at war," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(2-3), pages 225-242.
    8. George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 2000. "Economics and Identity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(3), pages 715-753.
    9. Daniel Kahneman & Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, 1991. "Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 193-206, Winter.
    10. Edward L. Glaeser, 2005. "The Political Economy of Hatred," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 120(1), pages 45-86.
    11. Brauer, Jurgen & van Tuyll, Hubert, 2008. "Castles, Battles, and Bombs," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, number 9780226071633, September.
    12. Weingast, Barry R, 1995. "The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 1-31, April.
    13. De Mesquita, Bruce Bueno, 2006. "Game Theory, Political Economy, and the Evolving Study of War and Peace," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 100(4), pages 637-642, November.
    14. de Mesquita, Bruce Bueno & Siverson, Randolph M., 1995. "War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(4), pages 841-855, December.
    15. Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Skaperdas, Stergios (ed.), 2012. "The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195392777.
    16. Mark Harrison, 2006. "An Economist Looks at Suicide Terrorism," World Economics, World Economics, 1 Ivory Square, Plantation Wharf, London, United Kingdom, SW11 3UE, vol. 7(3), pages 1-15, July.
    17. Ron Smith, 2009. "Power and Money," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Military Economics, chapter 2, pages 19-53, Palgrave Macmillan.
    18. Houghton, David Patrick, 1996. "The Role of Analogical Reasoning in Novel Foreign-Policy Situations," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 26(4), pages 523-552, October.
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    Keywords

    Coercion; Conflict; Games; Errors; Increasing Returns; Rational Choice; Scale; Surplus; Violence.;
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