The Economics of Coercion and Conflict: an Introduction
This chapter introduces the author’s selected papers on the economics of coercion and conflict. It defines coercion and conflict and relates them. In conflict, adversaries make costly investments in the means of coercion. The application of coercion does not remove choice but limits it to options that leave the victim worse off than before. Coercion and conflict are always political, but a number of key concepts from economics can help us understand them. These include rational choice, strategic interaction, increasing and diminishing returns, scale and state capacity, surplus extraction, and Type I errors. The chapter concludes that the economist’s toolkit, although not complete, is useful.
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- Andrei Markevich, 2007.
"How Much Control is Enough? Monitoring and Enforcement under Stalin,"
w0110, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
- Markevich, Andrei, 2007. "How Much Control is Enough? Monitoring and Enforcement under Stalin," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 829, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Mark Harrison & Nikolaus Wolf, 2012.
"The frequency of wars,"
Economic History Review,
Economic History Society, vol. 65(3), pages 1055-1076, 08.
- Harrison, Mark; Wolf, Nikolaus, 2011. "The Frequency of Wars," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 38, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
- Harrison, Mark & Wolf, Nikolaus, 2008. "The Frequency of Wars," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 879, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Fearon, James D., 1995. "Rationalist explanations for war," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(03), pages 379-414, June.
- Brauer, Jurgen & van Tuyll, Hubert, 2008. "Castles, Battles, and Bombs," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 0, number 9780226071633.
- Edward L. Glaeser, 2002.
"The Political Economy of Hatred,"
NBER Working Papers
9171, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Weingast, Barry R, 1995. "The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 1-31, April.
- Besley, Timothy J. & Persson, Torsten, 2007.
"The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
6370, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2009. "The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1218-44, September.
- Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2007. "The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics," NBER Working Papers 13028, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2009. "The origins of state capacity: property rights, taxation and politics," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 33768, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2011.
"Trade and Insecure Resources,"
111201, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2013.
- Mark Harrison, 2006. "An Economist Looks at Suicide Terrorism," World Economics, World Economics, Economic & Financial Publishing, 1 Ivory Square, Plantation Wharf, London, United Kingdom, SW11 3UE, vol. 7(3), pages 1-15, July.
- George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 2000. "Economics And Identity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(3), pages 715-753, August.
- Daniel Kahneman & Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, 1991. "Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 193-206, Winter.
- Brennan, Geoffrey & Tullock, Gordon, 1982. "An economic theory of military tactics : Methodological individualism at war," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(2-3), pages 225-242.
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