Quantity Versus Quality in the Soviet Market for Weapons
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- Mark Harrison & Andrei Markevich, 2007. "Quantity Versus Quality in the Soviet Market for Weapons," Working Papers w0109, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
References listed on IDEAS
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2008. "Contracts as Reference Points," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 123(1), pages 1-48.
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- Schmitz, Patrick W, 2001.
"The Hold-up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory,"
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- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," MPRA Paper 12562, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Mark Harrison, 2001. "Soviet industry and the red army under stalin : a military-industrial complex?," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 609, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Andrei Markevich, 2007.
"The Dictator’s Dilemma: to Punish or to Assist? Plan Failures and Interventions under Stalin,"
w0107, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
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- Andrei Markevich & Mark Harrison, 2006. "Quality, experience, and monopoly: the Soviet market for weapons under Stalin -super-1," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 59(1), pages 113-142, February.
- Victor P. Goldberg, 1976. "Regulation and Administered Contracts," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(2), pages 426-448, Autumn.
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- Dieter Balkenborg & Todd Kaplan & Timothy Miller, 2012.
"A Simple Economic Teaching Experiment on the Hold-Up Problem,"
The Journal of Economic Education,
Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 43(4), pages 377-385, October.
- Balkenborg, Dieter & Kaplan, Todd R & Miller, Tim, 2010. "A simple economic teaching experiment on the hold-up problem," MPRA Paper 24772, University Library of Munich, Germany.
More about this item
KeywordsContracts ; Dictatorship ; Hold-Up Problem ; Soviet Economy;
- L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
- N4 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation
- P2 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-11-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-HIS-2007-11-24 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
- NEP-IND-2007-11-24 (Industrial Organization)
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