IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/ejlwec/v33y2012i3p621-643.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Morality, social norms and the rule of law as transaction cost-saving devices: the case of ancient Athens

Author

Listed:
  • Anastassios Karayiannis
  • Aristides Hatzis

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Anastassios Karayiannis & Aristides Hatzis, 2012. "Morality, social norms and the rule of law as transaction cost-saving devices: the case of ancient Athens," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 621-643, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:33:y:2012:i:3:p:621-643
    DOI: 10.1007/s10657-010-9150-6
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10657-010-9150-6
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10657-010-9150-6?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Yoram Barzel, 1997. "Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets," Chapters, in: Svetozar Pejovich (ed.), The Economic Foundations of Property Rights, chapter 13, pages 171-192, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Smith, Adam, 1759. "The Theory of Moral Sentiments," History of Economic Thought Books, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, number smith1759.
    3. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868.
    4. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "The Rise of the Regulatory State," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(2), pages 401-425, June.
    5. Mill, John Stuart, 1848. "Principles of Political Economy (II): Distribution," History of Economic Thought Books, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, volume 2, number mill1848-2.
    6. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Steven Shavell, 2002. "Law versus Morality as Regulators of Conduct," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(2), pages 227-257.
    8. Bitros, George C. & Karayiannis, Anastassios D., 2008. "Values and institutions as determinants of entrepreneurship in ancient Athens," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(2), pages 205-230, August.
    9. Avner Greif, 2008. "Commitment, Coercion and Markets: The Nature and Dynamics of Institutions Supporting Exchange," Springer Books, in: Claude Ménard & Mary M. Shirley (ed.), Handbook of New Institutional Economics, chapter 28, pages 727-786, Springer.
    10. Hatzis, Aristides N., 2002. "Having the cake and eating it too: efficient penalty clauses in Common and Civil contract law," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 381-406, December.
    11. Gary M. Anderson and Robert U. Tollison, 1992. "Morality and Monopoly: The Constitutional Political Economy of Religious Rules," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 12(2), pages 373-392, Fall.
    12. Robert Sugden, 2005. "Spontaneous Order," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare, chapter 1, pages 1-9, Palgrave Macmillan.
    13. Carl Shapiro, 1982. "Consumer Information, Product Quality, and Seller Reputation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 20-35, Spring.
    14. Mill, John Stuart, 1848. "Principles of Political Economy (III): Exchange," History of Economic Thought Books, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, volume 3, number mill1848-3.
    15. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    16. Douglass C, North, 1992. "Institutions, Ideology, and Economic Performance," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 11(3), pages 477-496, Winter.
    17. A.D. Karayiannis, 1992. "Entrepreneurship in Classical Greek Literature1," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 60(1), pages 37-51, March.
    18. George J. Stigler, 1974. "The Optimum Enforcement of Laws," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 55-67, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Akerlof, George A, 1983. "Loyalty Filters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(1), pages 54-63, March.
    20. Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March.
    21. William M. Landes, 1974. "An Economic Analysis of the Courts," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 164-214, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    22. Vito Tanzi, 2000. "Policies, Institutions and the Dark Side of Economics," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1398.
    23. Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-641, August.
    24. Mill, John Stuart, 1848. "Principles of Political Economy (I): Production," History of Economic Thought Books, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, volume 1, number mill1848-1.
    25. Cheung, Steven N S, 1969. "Transaction Costs, Risk Aversion, and the Choice of Contractual Arrangements," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(1), pages 23-42, April.
    26. Claude Menard & Mary M. Shirley (ed.), 2005. "Handbook of New Institutional Economics," Springer Books, Springer, number 978-0-387-25092-2, September.
    27. George A. Akerlof, 1980. "A Theory of Social Custom, of which Unemployment may be One Consequence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 94(4), pages 749-775.
    28. Schwartzberg, Melissa, 2004. "Athenian Democracy and Legal Change," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 98(2), pages 311-325, May.
    29. Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December.
    30. Bitros, George C. & Karayiannis, Anastassios D., 2010. "Morality, institutions and the wealth of nations: Some lessons from ancient Greece," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 68-81, March.
    31. Isaac Ehrlich, 1996. "Crime, Punishment, and the Market for Offenses," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 43-67, Winter.
    32. Michihiro Kandori, 1992. "Social Norms and Community Enforcement," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(1), pages 63-80.
    33. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Lucas, David S. & Fuller, Caleb S. & Piano, Ennio E., 2018. "Rooking the state," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 12-20.
    2. Giovanni B. Ramello, 2016. "The past, present and future of comparative law and economics," Chapters, in: Theodore Eisenberg & Giovanni B. Ramello (ed.), Comparative Law and Economics, chapter 1, pages 3-22, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Rustam Romaniuc & Katherine Farrow & Lisette Ibanez & Alain Marciano, 2016. "The perils of government enforcement," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 161-182, January.
    4. Arvanitidis Paschalis A. & Kyriazis Nicholas C., 2013. "Democracy and Public Choice in Classical Athens," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 19(2), pages 213-248, August.
    5. Economou, Emmanouel/Marios/Lazaros & Kyriazis, Nicholas & Zachilas, Loukas, 2016. "Interpreting sociopolitical change by using Chaos Theory: A lesson from Sparta and Athens," MPRA Paper 76117, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Rustam Romaniuc & Katherine Farrow & Lisette Ibanez & Alain Marciano, 2016. "The perils of government enforcement," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 161-182, January.
    7. Sanae Tashiro & Chu-Ping Lo, 2020. "When Social Norms Influence the Employment of Women: The Case of Japan," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 46(3), pages 460-482, June.
    8. McCannon Bryan C., 2012. "The Origin of Democracy in Athens," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(2), pages 531-562, October.
    9. Bryan C. McCannon, 2017. "Who pays taxes? Liturgies and the Antidosis procedure in Ancient Athens," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 407-421, December.
    10. Tridimas, George, 2015. "War, disenfranchisement and the fall of the ancient Athenian democracy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 102-117.
    11. Kasymov, Ulan & Wang, Xiaoxi & Zikos, Dimitrios & Chopan, Massih & Ibele, Benedikt, 2022. "Institutional Barriers to Sustainable Forest Management: Evidence from an Experimental Study in Tajikistan," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
    12. Hoch, Felix & Lohwasser, Todor S., 2019. "The influence of institutions on venture capital: How transaction costs, uncertainty, and change affect new ventures," Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics 9/2019, University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics.
    13. Aristides N. Hatzis, 2018. "Greece's institutional trap," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 39(8), pages 838-845, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, 2002. "Law Enforcement under Incomplete Law: Theory and Evidence from Financial Market Regulation," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 442, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    2. Xu, Cheng-Gang & Pistor, Katharina, 2003. "Law Enforcement under Incomplete Law: Theory and Evidence from Financial Market Regulation," CEPR Discussion Papers 3788, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Charles F. Manski, 2000. "Economic Analysis of Social Interactions," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 115-136, Summer.
    4. Kaushik Basu, 2016. "Beyond the Invisible Hand: Groundwork for a New Economics," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 9299.
    5. Algan, Yann & Cahuc, Pierre, 2014. "Trust, Growth, and Well-Being: New Evidence and Policy Implications," Handbook of Economic Growth, in: Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 2, pages 49-120, Elsevier.
    6. Leeson,Peter T., 2014. "Anarchy Unbound," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107025806.
    7. Etro, Federico, 2017. "Research in economics and game theory. A 70th anniversary," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 1-7.
    8. Kerton, Robert R. & Bodwell, Richard W., 1995. "Quality, Choice, and the Economics of Concealment: The Marketing of Lemons," Working Papers 9510, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics.
    9. Xiao, Erte & Houser, Daniel, 2009. "Avoiding the sharp tongue: Anticipated written messages promote fair economic exchange," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 393-404, June.
    10. Antonio Acconcia & Marcello D'Amato & Riccardo Martina, 2003. "Corruption and Tax Evasion with Competitive Bribes," CSEF Working Papers 112, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    11. McCloskey Deirdre Nansen, 2018. "The Two Movements in Economic Thought, 1700–2000: Empty Economic Boxes Revisited," Man and the Economy, De Gruyter, vol. 5(2), pages 1-20, December.
    12. Beck, Thorsten & Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Levine, Ross, 2006. "Bank supervision and corruption in lending," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(8), pages 2131-2163, November.
    13. Jean-Baptiste Fleury & Alain Marciano, 2022. "Methodological Individualism and the Foundations of the "Law and Economics" movement," Post-Print hal-03820441, HAL.
    14. Jacobsen, Catrine & Piovesan, Marco, 2016. "Tax me if you can: An artifactual field experiment on dishonesty," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 7-14.
    15. W. Bentley MacLeod, 2006. "Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts," CESifo Working Paper Series 1730, CESifo.
    16. He, Haoran & Wu, Keyu, 2016. "Choice set, relative income, and inequity aversion: An experimental investigation," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 177-193.
    17. Giovanni Immordino & Marco Pagano, 2010. "Legal Standards, Enforcement, and Corruption," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(5), pages 1104-1132, September.
    18. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez‐De‐Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2006. "What Works in Securities Laws?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(1), pages 1-32, February.
    19. Dong, Bin & Dulleck, Uwe & Torgler, Benno, 2012. "Conditional corruption," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 609-627.
    20. Joshua Schwartzstein & Andrei Shleifer, 2013. "An Activity-Generating Theory of Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(1), pages 1-38.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ancient Athens; Legal system; Social norms; Morality; Social capital; Transaction costs; Institutions; Economic growth; A13; B11; D02; K10; K41; K42; O43;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
    • B11 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought through 1925 - - - Preclassical (Ancient, Medieval, Mercantilist, Physiocratic)
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:33:y:2012:i:3:p:621-643. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.