IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

A survey of securities laws and enforcement

  • Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio

The author examines the theoretical and empirical literature pertaining to securities laws and their enforcement by regulators and courts to establish what is known and what is yet unclear. Recent empirical research in the field has established that law matters. Mandatory disclosure requirements, insider trading laws, safeguards against self-dealing transactions, adequate regulatory powers, and simple laws that are easily enforced aid in the development of capital markets. The debate is now focused on identifying which components of securities laws matter most and on what the optimal regulatory framework for each country should be. Although public enforcement of securities laws is important, the author finds that the largest impact comes from aspects of the law that facilitate private enforcement. This means that the development of capital markets depends crucially on creating laws that facilitate enforcement and improving court procedures that allow for a more efficient dispute resolution.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/10/06/000012009_20041006151556/Rendered/PDF/wps3405.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 3405.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 01 Sep 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3405
Contact details of provider: Postal: 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20433
Phone: (202) 477-1234
Web page: http://www.worldbank.org/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. RAFAEL LaPORTA & FLORENCIO LOPEZ-de-SILANES & ANDREI SHLEIFER & ROBERT W. VISHNY, . "Legal Determinants of External Finance,"," CRSP working papers 324, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
  2. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2002. "Legal Origins," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(4), pages 1193-1229, November.
  3. Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March.
  4. Laura Beny, . "A Comparative Empirical Investigation of Agency and Market Theories of Insider Trading," University of Michigan John M. Olin Center for Law & Economics Working Paper Series umichlwps-1003, University of Michigan John M. Olin Center for Law & Economics.
  5. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "The Rise of the Regulatory State," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(2), pages 401-425, June.
  6. Shleifer, Andrei & Wolfenzon, Daniel, 2002. "Investor protection and equity markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 3-27, October.
  7. Katharina Pistor & Cheng-Gang Xu, 2002. "Law enforcement under incomplete law: theory and evidence from financial market regulation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3748, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  8. Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, . "Law and Finance," Working Paper 19451, Harvard University OpenScholar.
  9. Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, 2002. "Law Enforcement under Incomplete Law: Theory and Evidence from Financial Market Regulation," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 442, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  10. Rafael Porta & Florencio de & Guillermo Zamarripa, 2002. "Related Lending," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm268, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Apr 2006.
  11. Marianne Bertrand & Paras Mehta & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2002. "Ferreting Out Tunneling: An Application To Indian Business Groups," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(1), pages 121-148, February.
  12. Spiller, Pablo T & Ferejohn, John, 1992. "The Economics and Politics of Administrative Law and Procedures: An Introduction," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(1), pages 1-17, March.
  13. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
  14. Leuz, Christian & Nanda, Dhananjay & Wysocki, Peter D., 2003. "Earnings management and investor protection: an international comparison," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 505-527, September.
  15. Rene M. Stulz, 1999. "Globalization of Equity Markets and the Cost of Capital," NBER Working Papers 7021, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Craig Doidge & G. Andrew Karolyi & Rene M. Stulz, 2001. "Why are Foreign Firms Listed in the U.S. Worth More?," NBER Working Papers 8538, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. Utpal Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, 2002. "The World Price of Insider Trading," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(1), pages 75-108, 02.
  18. William A. Reese, Jr. & Michael S. Weisbach, 2001. "Protection of Minority Shareholder Interests, Cross-listings in the United States, and Subsequent Equity Offerings," NBER Working Papers 8164, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  19. Edward Glaeser & Simon Johnson & Andrei Shleifer, 2001. "Coase Versus The Coasians," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(3), pages 853-899, August.
  20. Messick, Richard E, 1999. "Judicial Reform and Economic Development: A Survey of the Issues," World Bank Research Observer, World Bank Group, vol. 14(1), pages 117-36, February.
  21. Gary S. Becker, 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169.
  22. Hay, Jonathan R & Shleifer, Andrei, 1998. "Private Enforcement of Public Laws: A Theory of Legal Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 398-403, May.
  23. Grossman, S J & Hart, O D, 1980. " Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 35(2), pages 323-34, May.
  24. Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, . "What Works in Securities Laws?," Working Paper 19491, Harvard University OpenScholar.
  25. Mitton, Todd, 2002. "A cross-firm analysis of the impact of corporate governance on the East Asian financial crisis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 215-241, May.
  26. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2001. "A Reason for Quantity Regulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 431-435, May.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3405. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Roula I. Yazigi)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.