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How does law affect finance? An examination of equity tunneling in Bulgaria

  • Atanasov, Vladimir
  • Black, Bernard
  • Ciccotello, Conrad
  • Gyoshev, Stanley

We model and test the mechanisms through which law affects tunneling and tunneling affects firm valuation. In 2002, Bulgaria adopted legal changes which limit equity tunneling through dilutive equity offerings and freezeouts. Following the changes, minority shareholders participate equally in equity offerings, where before they suffered severe dilution; freezeout offer price ratios quadruple; and Tobin's q rises sharply for firms at high risk of tunneling. The paper shows the importance of legal rules in limiting equity tunneling, the role of equity tunneling risk as a factor in determining equity prices, and substitution by controlling shareholders between different forms of tunneling.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Financial Economics.

Volume (Year): 96 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 155-173

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:96:y:2010:i:1:p:155-173
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505576

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