IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/jfinqa/v42y2007i02p421-442_00.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Why Do Firms Go Dark?

Author

Listed:
  • Marosi, András
  • Massoud, Nadia

Abstract

In recent years, a number of firms and banks have decided to “go dark,” i.e., deregister with the Securities and Exchange Commission and delist from the major exchanges despite having a large number of outside shareholders. This paper seeks to answer two important questions: Why do firms choose to go dark? What are the consequences for shareholders? We find that firms with fewer valuable growth opportunities, greater insider ownership, lower institutional ownership, higher leverage, and lower market momentum are more likely to go dark. Furthermore, the cost of regulatory compliance is a driving force behind the going dark phenomenon.

Suggested Citation

  • Marosi, András & Massoud, Nadia, 2007. "Why Do Firms Go Dark?," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(02), pages 421-442, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:42:y:2007:i:02:p:421-442_00
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0022109000003331
    File Function: link to article abstract page
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gadi Barlevy & Pietro Veronesi, 2000. "Information Acquisition in Financial Markets," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, pages 79-90.
    2. Engle, Robert F., 1982. "A general approach to lagrange multiplier model diagnostics," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 83-104, October.
    3. Engle, Robert F, 1998. "Macroeconomic Announcements and Volatility of Treasury Futures," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt7rd4g3bk, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    4. Gerald P. Dwyer & R. W. Hafer, 1989. "Interest rates and economic announcements," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Mar, pages 34-46.
    5. repec:bla:joares:v:26:y:1988:i:1:p:82-106 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Michael J. Fleming & Eli M. Remolona, 1999. "Price Formation and Liquidity in the U.S. Treasury Market: The Response to Public Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(5), pages 1901-1915, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Glenn Boyle & Richard Meade, 2008. "Intra-country regulation of share markets: does one size fit all?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 151-165, April.
    2. Georgieva, Dobrina & Jandik, Tomas, 2012. "Alternative paths of convergence toward U.S. market and legal regulations: Cross-listing vs. merging with U.S. bidders," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, pages 230-251.
    3. Patricia Maria Bortolon & Annor da Silva Junior, 2015. "Delisting Brazilian Public Companies: Empirical Evidence about Corporate Governance Issues," Brazilian Business Review, Fucape Business School, pages 92-117.
    4. Duong, Truong X. & Huszár, Zsuzsa R. & Yamada, Takeshi, 2015. "The costs and benefits of short sale disclosure," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 124-139.
    5. Craig Doidge & G. Andrew Karolyi & René M. Stulz, 2010. "Why Do Foreign Firms Leave U.S. Equity Markets?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 65(4), pages 1507-1553, August.
    6. Leuz, Christian & Triantis, Alexander & Yue Wang, Tracy, 2008. "Why do firms go dark? Causes and economic consequences of voluntary SEC deregistrations," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2-3), pages 181-208, August.
    7. Coles, Jeffrey L., 2008. "Disclosure policy: A discussion of Leuz, Triantis and Wang (2008) on "going dark"," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2-3), pages 209-220, August.
    8. Boubakri, Narjess & Cosset, Jean-Claude & Samet, Anis, 2010. "The choice of ADRs," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(9), pages 2077-2095, September.
    9. Randall Morck, 2008. "Behavioral finance in corporate governance: economics and ethics of the devil’s advocate," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 12(2), pages 179-200, May.
    10. Doidge, Craig & Karolyi, George Andrew & Stulz, Rene M., 2015. "The U.S. Listing Gap," Working Paper Series 2015-07, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
    11. Isabel Feito-Ruiz & Clara Cardone-Riportella & Susana Menéndez-Requejo, 2014. "SMEs’ Delisting Decisions on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM): Family Holders and Financial Crisis," Working Papers 14.02, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Financial Economics and Accounting (former Department of Business Administration).
    12. Steen Thomsen & Frederik Vinten, 2014. "Delistings and the costs of governance: a study of European stock exchanges 1996–2004," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 18(3), pages 793-833, August.
    13. Randall Morck, 2009. "Generalized Agency Problems," NBER Working Papers 15051, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Constant Djama & Isabelle Martinez & Stéphanie Serve, 2012. "What do we know about delistings? A survey of the literature," Post-Print hal-00937899, HAL.
    15. Martinez, Isabelle & Serve, Stéphanie, 2011. "The delisting decision: The case of buyout offer with squeeze-out (BOSO)," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 228-239.
    16. Liu, Shinhua & Stowe, John D. & Hung, Ken, 2012. "Why U.S. firms delist from the Tokyo stock exchange: An empirical analysis," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 62-70.
    17. Daugherty, Mary & Georgieva, Dobrina, 2011. "Foreign cultures, Sarbanes-Oxley Act and cross-delisting," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, pages 208-223.
    18. Bruggemann, Ulf & Kaul, Aditya & Leuz, Christian & Werner, Ingrid M., 2013. "The Twilight Zone: OTC Regulatory Regimes and Market Quality," Working Paper Series 2013-09, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
    19. Kashefi Pour, Eilnaz, 2015. "IPO survival and CEOs’ decision-making power: The evidence of China," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, pages 247-267.
    20. Li, Xi, 2014. "The Sarbanes–Oxley act and cross-listed foreign private issuers," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 21-40.
    21. Atanasov, Vladimir & Black, Bernard & Ciccotello, Conrad & Gyoshev, Stanley, 2010. "How does law affect finance? An examination of equity tunneling in Bulgaria," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 155-173, April.
    22. Doidge, Craig & Karolyi, G. Andrew & Stulz, Rene, 2008. "Why Do Foreign Firms Leave U.S. Equity Markets? An Analysis of Deregistrations under SEC Exchange Act Rule 12h-6," Working Paper Series 2008-14, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
    23. Kashefi Pour, Eilnaz, 2017. "Entering the public bond market during the financial crisis: Underinvestment and asymmetric information costs," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, pages 102-114.
    24. Kashefi Pour, Eilnaz & Lasfer, Meziane, 2013. "Why do companies delist voluntarily from the stock market?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 4850-4860.
    25. Ting, Hsiu-I, 2013. "CEO turnover and shareholder wealth: Evidence from CEO power in Taiwan," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 66(12), pages 2466-2472.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:42:y:2007:i:02:p:421-442_00. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Keith Waters). General contact details of provider: http://journals.cambridge.org/jid_JFQ .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.