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On the Interaction of Deterrence and Emotions

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  • Khadjavi, Menusch

Abstract

This study analyzes deterrence schemes and their impact on stealing. The results confirm Becker’s deterrence hypothesis. Moreover, crowding out of pro-social behavior occurs due to deterrence incentives: when deterrence incentives first exist and are removed later on, subsequent behavior is more selfish than without this deterrence history. This study offers evidence that (part of this) crowding out takes place via change of emotions. Without deterrence incentives in place, in a variant of the dictator game, players with pro-social emotions steal less. When players face expected punishment, pro-social emotions are deactivated and do not decrease stealing; in this case, self-centered emotions get activated and motivate greater stealing. This study provides support for theories on emotions in behavioral criminal law and economics and offers new insights for deterrence policy. (JEL C91, D63, K42)
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Suggested Citation

  • Khadjavi, Menusch, 2014. "On the Interaction of Deterrence and Emotions," WiSo-HH Working Paper Series 14, University of Hamburg, Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences, WISO Research Laboratory.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:uhhwps:14
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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