An Economic Model of Moral Motivation
In this paper, we present an economic model of moral motivation. Consumers prefer regarding themselves as socially responsible individuals. Voluntary contributions to public goods are motivated by this preference. The self-image as socially responsible is determined by a comparison of one's actual behavior against an endogenous moral ideal. Public policy influences voluntary contributions through its effects on relative prices and budget or time constraints, but also indirectly through the policy's effect on the moral ideal. This implies that economic incentives may have adverse effects on contributions. We present survey data on recycling behavior and voluntary community work, which is consistent with the model predictions.
|Date of creation:||Dec 2000|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: P.O.Box 8131 Dep, N-0033 Oslo, Norway|
Phone: (+47) 21 09 00 00
Fax: +47 - 62 88 55 95
Web page: http://www.ssb.no/en/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hollander, Heinz, 1990. "A Social Exchange Approach to Voluntary Cooperation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1157-1167, December.
- Brekke, Kjell Arne & Kverndokk, Snorre & Nyborg, Karine, 2003.
"An economic model of moral motivation,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 87(9-10), pages 1967-1983, September.
- Sugden, Robert, 1984. "Reciprocity: The Supply of Public Goods through Voluntary Contributions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(376), pages 772-787, December.
- Lindbeck, Assar, 1997.
"Incentives and Social Norms in Household Behavior,"
622, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
- Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, 2000.
"A fine is a price,"
Natural Field Experiments
00258, The Field Experiments Website.
- Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, 2000. "Motivation Crowding Theory: A Survey of Empirical Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 245, CESifo Group Munich.
- John C. Harsanyi, 1955. "Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63, pages 309-309.
- Kjell Arne Brekke & Richard B. Howarth, 2000. "The Social Contingency of Wants," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 76(4), pages 493-503.
- Andreoni, James, 1988. "Privately provided public goods in a large economy: The limits of altruism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 57-73, February.
- George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 2000. "Economics and Identity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 115(3), pages 715-753.
- Andreoni, James, 1990. "Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(401), pages 464-477, June.
- Frey, Bruno S & Oberholzer-Gee, Felix, 1997. "The Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(4), pages 746-755, September.
- Bernheim, B Douglas, 1986. "On the Voluntary and Involuntary Provision of Public Goods," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 789-793, September.
- Nyborg, Karine, 2000. "Homo Economicus and Homo Politicus: interpretation and aggregation of environmental values," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 305-322, July.
- Karine Nyborg & Mari Rege, 2000. "The Evolution of Considerate Smoking Behavior," Discussion Papers 279, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ssb:dispap:290. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (L MaasÃ¸)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.