IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/halshs-00548981.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Green taxation and individual responsibility

Author

Listed:
  • Jérôme Ballet

    (LAAS - Laboratoire d'analyse et d'architecture des systèmes [Toulouse] - INP - Institut National Polytechnique [Toulouse] - INSA Toulouse - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées - Toulouse - INSA - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées - UPS - Université Toulouse III - Paul Sabatier - Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Abraham Lioui

    (Department of Economics - Bar-Ilan University [Israël])

  • Damien Bazin

    () (C3ED - Centre d'économie et d'éthique pour l'environnement et le développement - UVSQ - Université de Versailles Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines)

  • David Touahri

    () (LEST - Laboratoire d'économie et de sociologie du travail - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

The current article aims at studying the effects of taxation on environmental quality, in an economy where its agents are responsible. Individual responsibility towards nature is modelized by the voluntary effort to which the households have agreed insofar as the improvement of environmental quality is concerned. It is an original way to show that the individuals may feel committed towards the environment and assume obligations towards it as well as towards environmental public policy. Given that, in our model, such effort is taken from one's allocated time for leisure, its opportunity cost is that of the sacrificed time for leisure, and is therefore equal to the individual's wage. We shall highlight that State intervention through the introduction of a (green) tax always crowds out individual responsibility. However, the intensity of this crowding-out depends on the performance of the State. Moreover, State intervention could, depending on the amount of crowding-out, reduce the overall quality of the environment. In a general equilibrium setting, we show that the crowding-out effect is not systematic. This is because there will then be an interaction between effort (or work time) and the cost of that effort (linked to the individual's wage, and therefore to production and finally to work/effort). In this article, we shall discuss the conditions under which public policy crowds out individual responsibility within this context.

Suggested Citation

  • Jérôme Ballet & Abraham Lioui & Damien Bazin & David Touahri, 2007. "Green taxation and individual responsibility," Post-Print halshs-00548981, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00548981
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00548981
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, 2000. "Motivation Crowding Theory: A Survey of Empirical Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 245, CESifo Group Munich.
    2. Bazin, D. & Ballet, J. & Touahri, D., 2004. "Environmental responsibility versus taxation," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 129-134, June.
    3. John, A. & Pecchenino, R. & Schimmelpfennig, D. & Schreft, S., 1995. "Short-lived agents and the long-lived environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 127-141, September.
    4. Howarth, Richard B & Norgaard, Richard B, 1992. "Environmental Valuation under Sustainable Development," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 473-477, May.
    5. Brekke, Kjell Arne & Kverndokk, Snorre & Nyborg, Karine, 2003. "An economic model of moral motivation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(9-10), pages 1967-1983, September.
    6. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1982. "Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1345-1370, November.
    7. Andreoni, James, 1990. "Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(401), pages 464-477, June.
    8. Nyborg, Karine & Rege, Mari, 2003. "Does Public Policy Crowd Out Private Contributions to Public Goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 115(3-4), pages 397-418, June.
    9. Damien Bazin & Jérôme Ballet, 2006. "Positive Ethics in Economics," Post-Print halshs-00727583, HAL.
    10. Hollander, Heinz, 1990. "A Social Exchange Approach to Voluntary Cooperation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1157-1167, December.
    11. Greenwood, Jeremy & Hercowitz, Zvi & Huffman, Gregory W, 1988. "Investment, Capacity Utilization, and the Real Business Cycle," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(3), pages 402-417, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gerardo Marletto, 2009. "Heterodox Environmental Economix: Theoretical Strands in Search of a Paradigm," ECONOMICS AND POLICY OF ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 0(1), pages 25-33.
    2. Florian Marcel Nuta & Anca Gabriela Turtureanu, 2012. "Considerations Regarding the Environmental Responsibility and Taxation," Acta Universitatis Danubius. OEconomica, Danubius University of Galati, issue 1(1), pages 195-203, March.
    3. Florian Marcel Nu?a & Alina Cristina Nu?a, 2012. "The Impact of Financial Performance upon the Social Responsibility of Romanian SMEs – Point of View," Acta Universitatis Danubius. OEconomica, Danubius University of Galati, issue 4(4), pages 25-31, August.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    crowding-out effect; social responsibility; taxation;

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00548981. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.