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Corruption, Norms, and Legal Enforcement: Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets*

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  • Raymond Fisman
  • Edward Miguel

Abstract

We study cultural norms and legal enforcement in controlling corruption by analyzing the parking behavior of United Nations officials in Manhattan. Until 2002, diplomatic immunity protected UN diplomats from parking enforcement actions, so diplomats' actions were constrained by cultural norms alone. We find a strong effect of corruption norms: diplomats from high-corruption countries (on the basis of existing survey-based indices) accumulated significantly more unpaid parking violations. In 2002, enforcement authorities acquired the right to confiscate diplomatic license plates of violators. Unpaid violations dropped sharply in response. Cultural norms and (particularly in this context) legal enforcement are both important determinants of corruption. (c) 2007 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.

Suggested Citation

  • Raymond Fisman & Edward Miguel, 2007. "Corruption, Norms, and Legal Enforcement: Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(6), pages 1020-1048, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:115:y:2007:i:6:p:1020-1048
    DOI: 10.1086/527495
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    Replication

    This item has been replicated by:
  • Matheus Albergaria & Luiz Paulo Fávero, 2017. "Narrow Replication of Fisman and Miguel's (2007a) ‘Corruption, Norms, and Legal Enforcement: Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets’," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 32(4), pages 919-922, June.

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