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A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the Whaling Industry


  • Ellickson, Robert C


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  • Ellickson, Robert C, 1989. "A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the Whaling Industry," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(1), pages 83-97, Spring.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:5:y:1989:i:1:p:83-97

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Daniel R. Vincent, 1990. "Dynamic Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(1), pages 49-61.
    2. Samuelson, William F., 1985. "Competitive bidding with entry costs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 17(1-2), pages 53-57.
    3. Steven Kaplan, 1989. "Management Buyouts: Evidence on Taxes as a Source of Value," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 44(3), pages 611-632, July.
    4. Randall Morck & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1988. "Characteristics of Targets of Hostile and Friendly Takeovers," NBER Chapters,in: Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences, pages 101-136 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Schwartz, Alan, 1986. "Search Theory and the Tender Offer Auction," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 229-253, Fall.
    6. Michael J. Fishman, 1988. "A Theory of Preemptive Takeover Bidding," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 88-101, Spring.
    7. Harstad, Ronald M, 1990. "Alternative Common-Value Auction Procedures: Revenue Comparisons with Free Entry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 421-429, April.
    8. Lloyd, William P. & Modani, Naval K. & Hand, John H., 1987. "The effect of the degree of ownership control on firm diversification, market value, and merger activity," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 303-312, August.
    9. French, Kenneth R & McCormick, Robert E, 1984. "Sealed Bids, Sunk Costs, and the Process of Competition," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(4), pages 417-441, October.
    10. Alan J. Auerbach, 1988. "Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number auer88-1, January.
    11. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
    12. Hirshleifer, David, 1989. "Facilitation of Competing Bids and the Price of a Takeover Target," University of California at Los Angeles, Anderson Graduate School of Management qt2496649g, Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA.
    13. Kaplan, Steven, 1989. " Management Buyouts: Evidence on Taxes as a," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 44(3), pages 611-632, July.
    14. Nathan, Kevin S. & O'Keefe, Terrence B., 1989. "The rise in takeover premiums : An exploratory study," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 101-119, June.
    15. Michael C. Jensen, 1987. "The free cash flow theory of takeovers: a financial perspective on mergers and acquisitions and the economy," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, vol. 31, pages 102-148.
    16. Rothkopf, Michael H & Teisberg, Thomas J & Kahn, Edward P, 1990. "Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(1), pages 94-109, February.
    17. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1980. "Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 42-64, Spring.
    18. Williamson, Oliver E, 1983. "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 519-540, September.
    19. Ralph A. Walkling & Michael S. Long, 1984. "Agency Theory, Managerial Welfare, and Takeover Bid Resistance," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(1), pages 54-68, Spring.
    20. Asher Wolinsky, 1988. "Dynamic Markets with Competitive Bidding," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 55(1), pages 71-84.
    21. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions and Bidding," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June.
    22. Bhattacharyya, S., 1990. "The Analytics Of Takeover Bidding: Initial Bids And Their Premia," GSIA Working Papers 89-90-03, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
    23. Spulber, Daniel F, 1990. "Auctions and Contract Enforcement," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 325-344, Fall.
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    Cited by:

    1. Erik O. Kimbrough & Alexander Vostroknutov, 2012. "Rules, Rule-Following, and Cooperation," Discussion Papers dp12-15, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
    2. Hilt, Eric, 2008. "The negative trade-off between risk and incentives: Evidence from the american whaling industry," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 45(4), pages 424-444, September.
    3. repec:eee:jeborg:v:141:y:2017:i:c:p:151-163 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Adam Gifford, 2000. "The Bioeconomics of Cooperation," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 153-168, May.
    5. Marc F. Bellemare, 2012. "Insecure Land Rights and Share Tenancy: Evidence from Madagascar," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 88(1), pages 155-180.
    6. Avinash K Dixit, 2007. "Governance Institutions and Development," Working Papers id:1075, eSocialSciences.
    7. Scott E. Masten & Jens Prüfer, 2014. "On the Evolution of Collective Enforcement Institutions: Communities and Courts," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(2), pages 359-400.
    8. Kimbrough, Erik O. & Wilson, Bart J., 2013. "Insiders, outsiders, and the adaptability of informal rules to ecological shocks," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 29-40.
    9. Skarbek, David, 2012. "Prison gangs, norms, and organizations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 96-109.
    10. Bellemare, Marc F. & Novak, Lindsey & Steinmetz, Tara L., 2015. "All in the family: Explaining the persistence of female genital cutting in West Africa," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 252-265.
    11. Armelle Mazé, 2005. "Contract Law and the self-enforcing range of contracts in agriculture," Working Papers halshs-00354960, HAL.
    12. Hilt, Eric, 2006. "Incentives in Corporations: Evidence from the American Whaling Industry," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 49(1), pages 197-227, April.
    13. Daniel Smith, 2014. "Heterogeneity and exchange: Safe-conducts in Medieval Spain," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 27(2), pages 183-197, June.
    14. Bart Wilson, 2015. "Further towards a theory of the emergence of property," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 163(1), pages 201-222, April.
    15. Benson, Bruce L. & Siddiqui, Zafar R., 2014. "Pashtunwali—Law for the lawless, defense for the stateless," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 108-120.
    16. T. Randolph Beard & Richard Alan Seals Jr. & Michael L. Stern, 2014. "Security and Government Credibility," Auburn Economics Working Paper Series auwp2014-07, Department of Economics, Auburn University.
    17. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00624288 is not listed on IDEAS

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