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A theory of the pre-modern British aristocracy

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  • Allen, Douglas W.

Abstract

Between c. 1550 -c. 1880, a small group of individuals ruled England and oversaw her transformation from a small country to the British Empire--and in the process they became exceedingly wealthy. Known as aristocrats, their unusual lifestyles were the antithesis of modern secular values. Today aristocrats are often viewed as a hindrance to pre-modern growth and development because they appeared to operate so inefficiently. This paper argues that the aristocrats efficiently provided the valuable service of "trustworthy servant", by investing their wealth in hostage capital. This theory explains terms of entry and exit out of the aristocracy, the strict family settlement, their education patterns, extravagant lifestyle, and their ultimate voluntary retreat from power.

Suggested Citation

  • Allen, Douglas W., 2009. "A theory of the pre-modern British aristocracy," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 299-313, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:exehis:v:46:y:2009:i:3:p:299-313
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Marc Goñi, 2023. "Landed elites and education provision in England: evidence from school boards, 1871-99," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 125-171, March.
    2. Vincent Geloso & Louis Rouanet, 2023. "Ethnogenesis and statelessness," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 55(3), pages 377-407, June.
    3. Paula Eugenia Gobbi & Marc Goñi, 2020. "Childless Aristocrats. Inheritance and the extensive margin of fertility," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/316217, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    4. Graeme G. Acheson & Gareth Campbell & John D. Turner, 2017. "Who financed the expansion of the equity market? Shareholder clienteles in Victorian Britain," Business History, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 59(4), pages 607-637, May.

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