Purchase, Patronage, and Professions: Incentives and the Evolution of Public Office in Pre-Modern Britain
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References listed on IDEAS
- Allen, Douglas W, 1998. "Compatible Incentives and the Purchase of Military Commissions," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(1), pages 45-66, January.
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- Noel D., Johnson & Mark, Koyama, 2012. "Standardizing the fiscal state: cabal tax farming as an Intermediate Institution in early-modern England and France," MPRA Paper 40403, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Habib, Michel Antoine, 2015. "Multifaceted Transactions, Incentives, and Organizational Form," CEPR Discussion Papers 10432, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Johnson, Noel D. & Koyama, Mark, 2014. "Tax farming and the origins of state capacity in England and France," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 1-20.
- Allen, Douglas W., 2009. "A theory of the pre-modern British aristocracy," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 299-313, July.
More about this item
- L3 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise
- N4 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation
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