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The British Navy Rules: Monitoring and Incompatible Incentives in the Age of Fighting Sail


  • Allen, Douglas W.


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  • Allen, Douglas W., 2002. "The British Navy Rules: Monitoring and Incompatible Incentives in the Age of Fighting Sail," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 204-231, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:exehis:v:39:y:2002:i:2:p:204-231

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Eaton, Curtis & White, William D, 1983. "The Economy of High Wages: An Agency Problem," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 50(198), pages 175-181, May.
    2. Allen, Douglas W, 1998. "Compatible Incentives and the Purchase of Military Commissions," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(1), pages 45-66, January.
    3. Barzel, Yoram, 1977. "An Economic Analysis of Slavery," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(1), pages 87-110, April.
    4. Sappington, David, 1983. "Limited liability contracts between principal and agent," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 1-21, February.
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    Blog mentions

    As found by, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. The Historical Contingency of Rules and the Immutability of Economic Laws
      by Jonathan Finegold in Economic Thought on 2014-06-06 07:47:20


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Hilt, Eric, 2008. "The negative trade-off between risk and incentives: Evidence from the american whaling industry," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 45(4), pages 424-444, September.
    2. Benjamin, Daniel K. & Thornberg, Christopher F., 2003. "Comment: Rules, monitoring, and incentives in the age of sail," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 195-211, April.
    3. Allen, Douglas W., 2003. "Rules and rewards in the age of sail: a reply," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 212-220, April.
    4. Forestier, Albane, 2005. "Principle-agent problems in the French slave trade: the case of Rochelais Armateurs and their agents, 1763-1792," Economic History Working Papers 22478, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History.
    5. Allen, Douglas W., 2009. "A theory of the pre-modern British aristocracy," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 299-313, July.
    6. Yang, Der-Yuan, 2008. "On the elements and practices of monitoring," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(3-4), pages 654-666, March.

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