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The British Navy Rules: Monitoring and Incompatible Incentives in the Age of Fighting Sail

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  • Allen, Douglas W.

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  • Allen, Douglas W., 2002. "The British Navy Rules: Monitoring and Incompatible Incentives in the Age of Fighting Sail," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 204-231, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:exehis:v:39:y:2002:i:2:p:204-231
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:bla:econom:v:50:y:1983:i:198:p:175-81 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Allen, Douglas W, 1998. "Compatible Incentives and the Purchase of Military Commissions," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(1), pages 45-66, January.
    3. Barzel, Yoram, 1977. "An Economic Analysis of Slavery," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(1), pages 87-110, April.
    4. Sappington, David, 1983. "Limited liability contracts between principal and agent," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 1-21, February.
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    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. The Historical Contingency of Rules and the Immutability of Economic Laws
      by Jonathan Finegold in Economic Thought on 2014-06-06 07:47:20

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    1. repec:ehl:lserod:22478 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Douglas W. Allen & Peter T. Leeson, 2015. "Institutionally Constrained Technology Adoption: Resolving the Longbow Puzzle," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(3).
    3. Benjamin, Daniel K. & Thornberg, Christopher F., 2003. "Comment: Rules, monitoring, and incentives in the age of sail," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 195-211, April.
    4. Broadberry, Stephen & Zhai, Runzhuo, 2025. "Innovation and the Great Divergence," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 771, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    5. Allen, Douglas W., 2003. "Rules and rewards in the age of sail: a reply," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 212-220, April.
    6. repec:oup:ereveh:v:24:y::i:4:p:696-715. is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Arteaga, Fernando & Desierto, Desiree & Koyama, Mark, 2024. "Shipwrecked by rents," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 168(C).
    8. Forestier, Albane, 2005. "Principle-agent problems in the French slave trade: the case of Rochelais Armateurs and their agents, 1763-1792," Economic History Working Papers 22478, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History.
    9. Allen, Douglas W., 2009. "A theory of the pre-modern British aristocracy," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 299-313, July.
    10. Piano, Ennio E. & Rouanet, Louis, 2020. "Desertion as theft," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 169-183, April.
    11. Voth, Hans-Joachim & Xu, Guo, 2020. "Encouraging Others: Punishment and Performance in the Royal Navy," CEPR Discussion Papers 14476, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Yang, Der-Yuan, 2008. "On the elements and practices of monitoring," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(3-4), pages 654-666, March.
    13. Ennio E Piano & Byron B Carson, 2020. "Scalp-taking," Rationality and Society, , vol. 32(1), pages 40-66, February.
    14. Ennio Piano, 2020. "Coase Goes to War: Contract Choice on the Battlefield," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 130(6), pages 1001-1023.
    15. Hilt, Eric, 2008. "The negative trade-off between risk and incentives: Evidence from the american whaling industry," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 45(4), pages 424-444, September.
    16. Voth, Hans-Joachim & Xu, Guo, 2019. "Patronage for Productivity: Selection and Performance in the Age of Sail," CEPR Discussion Papers 13963, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. Hilt, Eric, 2006. "Incentives in Corporations: Evidence from the American Whaling Industry," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 49(1), pages 197-227, April.
    18. Eugene White, 2003. "Historical perspectives on financial development and economic growth - commentary," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 85(Jul), pages 107-110.

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