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Principle-agent problems in the French slave trade: the case of Rochelais Armateurs and their agents, 1763-1792

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  • Forestier, Albane

Abstract

La Rochelle, the fourth largest slaving port in France in the eighteenth-century, is used as a case study in the application of agency theory to long-distance trade. This analysis explores an area not accounted for in the literature on French commercial practices. Being broadly couched in a New Institutionalist framework, this study explores the formal and informal institutions designed to curb agency problems, and emphasizes the ex-post strategies such as social rewarding, to which little attention is usually paid. It also finds reputation-effect strategies were efficiently combined with a well-operating legal system. It subsequently challenges the traditional dichotomy between societies where personal links dominated the economy and modern societies where business links are predominantly impersonal. As a result, this empirical analysis leads to a reappraisal of private ordering as opposed to legal centralism and calls for more theoretical research.

Suggested Citation

  • Forestier, Albane, 2005. "Principle-agent problems in the French slave trade: the case of Rochelais Armateurs and their agents, 1763-1792," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 22478, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:22478
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    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/22478/
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • N0 - Economic History - - General
    • R14 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Land Use Patterns
    • J01 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - Labor Economics: General

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