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The Role of the Merchant Coalition in Pre-modern Japanese Economic Development: An Historical Institutional Analysis

Author

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  • Tetsuji Okazaki

    (Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo)

Abstract

This paper examines the economic role of the merchant coalition (kabu nakama) in Japan during the the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth century in Japan. During this period public sector enforcement of contracts was imperfect. Kabu nakama substituted for the public sector, using a multilateral punishment strategy. When the government (Bakufu) prohibited kabu nakama in 1841, the growth rate of the real money supply contracted, efficiency of price arbitrage declined, and the inflation rate increased.

Suggested Citation

  • Tetsuji Okazaki, 2004. "The Role of the Merchant Coalition in Pre-modern Japanese Economic Development: An Historical Institutional Analysis," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-284, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    • Handle: RePEc:tky:fseres:2004cf284
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    Cited by:

    1. Sahle, Esther, 2014. "Quakers, coercion and pre-modern growth: why friends’ formal institutions for contract enforcement did not matter for early Atlantic trade expansion," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 60452, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. Ferrali, Romain, 2012. "The Maghribi industrialists: contract enforcement in the Moroccan industry, 1956-82," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 45680, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    3. Sahle, Esther, 2014. "Quakers, coercion and pre-modern growth: why friends’ formal institutions for contract enforcement did not matter for early Atlantic trade expansion," Economic History Working Papers 60452, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History.
    4. Tomihiro Machikita & Tetsuji Okazaki, 2019. "Transition to a Modern Regime and Change in PlantLifecycles: A Natural Experiment from Meiji Japan," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1122, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    5. Aidin Hajikhameneh & Jared Rubin, 2019. "Exchange in the Absence of Legal Enforcement: Reputation and Multilateral Punishment under Uncertainty," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 35(1), pages 192-237.
    6. Masaki Nakabayashi & Tetsuji Okazaki, 2007. "The Role of the Courts in Economic Development: The Case of Prewar Japan," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-517, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    7. Yamamura, Eiji, 2008. "The role of social capital in homogeneous society: Review of recent researches in Japan," MPRA Paper 11385, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Ferrali, Romain, 2012. "The Maghribi industrialists: contract enforcement in the Moroccan industry, 1956-82," Economic History Working Papers 45680, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History.
    9. Tomohiro Machikita & Tetsuji Okazaki, 2019. "Transition to a Modern Regime and Change in Plant Lifecycles: A Natural Experiment from Meiji Japan," CIGS Working Paper Series 19-006E, The Canon Institute for Global Studies.
    10. Hajikhameneh, Aidin, 2024. "Reputation or court: Individualism, collectivism, and the choice of enforcement mechanism in exchange," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 217(C), pages 184-206.
    11. Bassino, Jean-Pascal & van der Eng, Pierre, 2019. "Japan and the Asian Divergence: Market Integration, Climate Anomalies and Famines during the 18th and 19th Centuries," CEI Working Paper Series 2018-18, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    12. Yamamura Eiji, 2008. "The Market for Lawyers and Social Capital: Are Informal Rules a Substitute for Formal Ones?," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 499-517, December.

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