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The Market for Lawyers and Social Capital: Are Informal Rules a Substitute for Formal Ones?

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  • Yamamura Eiji

    (Seinan Gakuin University)

Abstract

Japan's prefecture-level panel data is used to examine how the demand for lawyers is affected by social capital after controlling for economic conditions. The main findings from a fixed effects model are: (1) The demand for lawyer is smaller when people live close and cohesively. (2) Conflicts generated by bankruptcies cause people to seek legal resolutions, thus relying on lawyers. Nevertheless, the elasticity of demand in Japan is small, reflecting a feature of Japan that the norm is to settle a matter informally.

Suggested Citation

  • Yamamura Eiji, 2008. "The Market for Lawyers and Social Capital: Are Informal Rules a Substitute for Formal Ones?," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 499-517, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:4:y:2008:i:1:n:23
    DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1295
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    Cited by:

    1. Eiji Yamamura, 2011. "How Do Neighbors Influence Investment in Social Capital? Homeownership and Length of Residence," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 17(4), pages 451-464, November.
    2. Yamamura, Eiji, 2013. "Trial experience, satisfaction and incentive to bring another lawsuit: Does aspiration level influence winners and losers?," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 125-131.
    3. Eiji Yamamura, 2011. "Homeownership and investment for social capital in Japan: Dynamic Panel approach," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 31(3), pages 2250-2259.
    4. Yamamura, Eiji, 2011. "The effects of the social norm on cigarette consumption: Evidence from Japan using panel data," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 6-12, January.
    5. Yamamura, Eiji, 2013. "Effects of sex preference and social pressure on fertility in changing Japanese families," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 97-104.
    6. Yamamura, Eiji, 2011. "Different effects of social capital on health status among residents: Evidence from modern Japan," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 40(5), pages 475-479.
    7. Yamamura, Eiji, 2009. "What Discourages Participation in the Lay Judge System (Saiban’in Seido) of Japan? Interaction between the Secrecy Requirement and Social Networks," MPRA Paper 17197, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Yamamura, Eiji, 2009. "What discourages participation in the lay judge system (Saiban'in seido) of Japan? : an interaction effect between the secrecy requirement and social network," MPRA Paper 15920, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Yamamura, Eiji, 2009. "Differences of the effects of social capital on health status among residents: evidence from modern Japan," MPRA Paper 14983, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Eiji Yamamura, 2011. "Brand and Performance in a New Environment: Analysis of the Law School Market in Japan," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 39(2), pages 155-164, June.
    11. Amanda Carmignani & Silvia Giacomelli, 2010. "Too many lawyers? Litigation in Italian civil courts," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 745, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    12. Yamamura, Eiji, 2009. "Dynamics of social trust and human capital in the learning process: The case of the Japan garment cluster in the period 1968-2005," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 377-389, October.
    13. Yamamura, Eiji, 2010. "The effect of learning varies according to locality: Micro data analysis of the lawyer market in Japan," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 193-197, August.
    14. Yamamura, Eiji, 2011. "Comparison of the effects of homeownership by individuals and their neighbors on social capital formation: Evidence from Japanese General Social Surveys," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 40(5), pages 637-644.
    15. repec:kap:iaecre:v:17:y:2011:i:4:p:451-464 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Eiji YAMAMURA, 2011. "pOSITIVE EXTERNALITIES OF CONGESTION ON HEALTH: A CASE STUDY OF CHRONIC ILLNESS IN JAPAN FOR THE PERIOD 1988– 2009," Theoretical and Empirical Researches in Urban Management, Research Centre in Public Administration and Public Services, Bucharest, Romania, vol. 6(3), pages 15-34, August.
    17. Yamamura, Eiji, 2008. "The role of social capital in homogeneous society: Review of recent researches in Japan," MPRA Paper 11385, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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