The Effect of Learning Varies According to Locality: Micro Data Analysis of the Lawyer Market in Japan
Using individual level data, this paper examines how and to what extent behavior and perception of those bringing lawsuit’s differ between large district courts (competitive lawyer market) and medium or small district ones (less competitive lawyer markets). The major findings are; (1) in medium or small, but not large districts, trial experience discourages people from employing a lawyer. (2) A natural person is less likely to employ a lawyer than a legal entity in medium or small districts, but not in large ones. (3) The self-rated cost of searching for a lawyer is lower in large districts than small ones. It follows from these results that the lower competitive pressure in the lawyer markets in medium and small districts results in higher costs to employ a lawyer than is found in large districts.
|Date of creation:||14 Jan 2010|
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