The Transition from Relational to Legal Contract Enforcement
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- Fali Huang, 2006. "The Transition from Relational to Legal Contract Enforcement," Development Economics Working Papers 22441, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
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- Joshua Charap & Jelena Pavlovic, 2009. "Development of the Commercial Banking System in Afghanistan; Risks and Rewards," IMF Working Papers 09/150, International Monetary Fund.
More about this item
Keywordsrelational contract; legal contract enforcement; institutions; endowment inequality; economic development;
- O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
- K49 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Other
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-DEV-2006-11-18 (Development)
- NEP-LAW-2006-11-18 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-SEA-2006-11-18 (South East Asia)
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