Task Assignment and Organizational Form
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Kerstin Puschke, 2009. "Task assignment and organizational form," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 96(2), pages 149-168, March.
- Puschke, Kerstin, 2006. "Task assignment and organizational form," Discussion Papers 2006/19, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
- Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972.
"Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
- Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, 1971. "Production, Information Costs and Economic Organizations," UCLA Economics Working Papers 10A, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Eyal Winter, 2004.
"Incentives and Discrimination,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 764-773, June.
- Eyal Winter, 2003. "Incentives and Discrimination," Discussion Paper Series dp313, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-29, February.
- Alfred D. Chandler, 1969. "Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the American Industrial Enterprise," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262530090, February.
- Bengt Holmstrom, 1982.
"Moral Hazard in Teams,"
Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn.
- Bengt Holmstrom, 1981. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Discussion Papers 471, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Wouter Dessein & Luis Garicano & Robert Gertner, 2010.
"Organizing for Synergies,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 77-114, November.
- Gertner, Robert & Garicano, Luis & Dessein, Wouter, 2007. "Organizing for Synergies," CEPR Discussion Papers 6019, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Eric Maskin & Yingyi Qian & Chenggang Xu, 2000.
"Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form,"
Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(2), pages 359-378.
- Eric Maskin & Yingyi Qian & Chenggang Xu, 1997. "Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form," Working Papers 97034, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Eric Maskin & Yingyi Qian & Chenggang Xu, 1999. "Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form," Working Papers 99009, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- HOLMSTROM, Bengt, 1979. "Moral hazard and observability," LIDAM Reprints CORE 379, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Yingyi Qian & Gerard Roland & Chenggang Xu, 2006. "Coordination and Experimentation in M-Form and U-Form Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(2), pages 366-402, April.
- Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
- David Besanko & Pierre Régibeau & Katharine E. Rockett, 2005.
"A Multi‐Task Principal‐Agent Approach To Organizational Form,"
Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(4), pages 437-467, December.
- Régibeau, Pierre & Rockett, Kate & Besanko, David, 2000. "A Multi-Task Principal-Agent Approach to Organizational Form," CEPR Discussion Papers 2443, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1995. "Some implications of growth for organizational form and ownership structure," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 440-455, April.
- Holmstrom, Bengt R. & Tirole, Jean, 1989. "The theory of the firm," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 61-133, Elsevier.
- Bengt Holmstrom, 1979.
"Moral Hazard and Observability,"
Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
- Bengt Holmstrom, 1997. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1205, David K. Levine.
- R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), 1989. "Handbook of Industrial Organization," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 2, number 2.
- Sappington, David, 1983. "Limited liability contracts between principal and agent," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 1-21, February.
- R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), 1989. "Handbook of Industrial Organization," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 1.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Emilie Dargaud & Armel Jacques, 2015.
"Hidden collusion by decentralization: firm organization and antitrust policy,"
Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 114(2), pages 153-176, March.
- Emilie Dargaud & Armel Jacques, 2013. "Hidden collusion by decentralization: firms' organization and antitrust policy," Post-Print halshs-00861216, HAL.
- Emilie Dargaud & Armel Jacques, 2015. "Hidden collusion by decentralization: firm organization and antitrust policy," Post-Print hal-01450833, HAL.
- Koulovatianos, Christos & Schrder, Carsten & Schmidt, Ulrich, 2009.
"Nonmarket Household Time and the Cost of Children,"
Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 27, pages 42-51.
- Koulovatianos, Christos & Schröder, Carsten & Schmidt, Ulrich, 2006. "Non-market household time and the cost of children," Discussion Papers 2006/22, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
- Koulovatianos, Christos & Schröder, Carsten & Schmidt, Ulrich, 2009. "Nonmarket household time and the cost of children," Open Access Publications from Kiel Institute for the World Economy 28906, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
- Christos Koulovatianos & Carsten Schröder & Ulrich Schmidt, 2006. "Non-Market Household Time and the cost of Children," Vienna Economics Papers vie0606, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Christos Koulovatianos & Carsten Schröder & Ulrich Schmidt, 2008. "Nonmarket Household Time and the Cost of Children," Discussion Papers 08/07, University of Nottingham, Centre for Finance, Credit and Macroeconomics (CFCM).
- Te Bao & Yongqin Wang, 2012. "Incomplete contract, bargaining and optimal divisional structure," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 107(1), pages 81-96, September.
- Schöttner, Anja & Rohlfing-Bastian, Anna, 2015.
"Optimal Allocation of Decision-Making Authority and the Provision of Incentives under Uncertainty,"
VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy
113200, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Schöttner, Anja & Rohlfing-Bastian, Anna, 2016. "Optimal Allocation of Decision-Making Authority and the Provision of Incentives under Uncertainty," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145670, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Kerstin Puschke, "undated".
"Optimal Hierarchies with Diverse Decision-Makers,"
Papers
034, Departmental Working Papers.
- Puschke, Kerstin, 2007. "Optimal hierarchies with diverse decision-makers," Discussion Papers 2007/10, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
- repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2373-2437 is not listed on IDEAS
- Michael Waldman, 2012.
"Theory and Evidence in Internal Labor Markets,"
Introductory Chapters, in: Robert Gibbons & John Roberts (ed.),The Handbook of Organizational Economics,
Princeton University Press.
- Waldman, Michael, 2007. "Theory and evidence in internal labor markets," MPRA Paper 5113, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- David Besanko & Pierre Régibeau & Katharine E. Rockett, 2005.
"A Multi‐Task Principal‐Agent Approach To Organizational Form,"
Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(4), pages 437-467, December.
- Régibeau, Pierre & Rockett, Kate & Besanko, David, 2000. "A Multi-Task Principal-Agent Approach to Organizational Form," CEPR Discussion Papers 2443, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Chang, Myong-Hun & Harrington, Joseph Jr., 2006.
"Agent-Based Models of Organizations,"
Handbook of Computational Economics, in: Leigh Tesfatsion & Kenneth L. Judd (ed.), Handbook of Computational Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 26, pages 1273-1337,
Elsevier.
- Myong-Hun Chang & Joseph E Harrington Jr, 2004. "Agent-Based Models of Organizations," Economics Working Paper Archive 515, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
- Gibbons, Robert, 2005. "Four forma(lizable) theories of the firm?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 200-245, October.
- Luis Garicano & Luis Rayo, 2016.
"Why Organizations Fail: Models and Cases,"
Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(1), pages 137-192, March.
- Garicano, Luis & Rayo, Luis, 2015. "Why organizations fail: models and cases," CEPR Discussion Papers 10395, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bruno Deffains & Dominique Demougin, 2006. "Governance: Who Controls Matters," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2006-053, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
- Oindrila Dey & Swapnendu Banerjee, 2022.
"Incentives, Status and Thereafter: A Critical Survey,"
South Asian Journal of Macroeconomics and Public Finance, , vol. 11(1), pages 95-115, June.
- Dey, Oindrila & Banerjee, Swapnendu, 2010. "Incentive, status and thereafter: A critical survey," MPRA Paper 57058, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Richard N. Langlois & Nicolai J. Foss, 1999.
"Capabilities and Governance: The Rebirth of Production in the Theory of Economic Organization,"
Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(2), pages 201-218, May.
- Richard N. Langlois & Nicolai J. Foss, 1996. "Capabilities and Governance the Rebirth of Production in the Theory of Economic Organization," Working papers 1996-02, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Richard N. Langlois & Nicolai J. Foss, 1997. "Capabilities and Governance the Rebirth of Production in the Theory of Economic Organization," DRUID Working Papers 97-2, DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies.
- James Jr., Harvey S., 1998. "Are employment and managerial control equivalent? Evidence from an electronics producer," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 447-471, September.
- Helmut Bester & Daniel Krähmer, 2008.
"Delegation and incentives,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(3), pages 664-682, September.
- Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel, 2006. "Delegation and incentives," Discussion Papers 2007/1, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
- Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel, 2007. "Delegation and Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 6042, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Christoph Feichter & Isabella Grabner, 2020. "Empirische Forschung zu Management Control – Ein Überblick und neue Trends [Empirical Management Control Reserach—An Overview and Future Directions]," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 72(2), pages 149-181, June.
- Spiegel, Yossi, 2009. "Managerial overload and organization design," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(1), pages 53-55, October.
- Michel Magnan & Dominic Martin, 2019. "Executive Compensation and Employee Remuneration: The Flexible Principles of Justice in Pay," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 160(1), pages 89-105, November.
- Dey, Oindrila & Banerjee, Swapnendu, 2014. "Status and incentives: A critical survey," MPRA Paper 57658, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Shasikanta Nandeibam, 1994. "A free-rider problem with a free-riding principal," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 1(1), pages 227-250, December.
- Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997.
"A Survey of Corporate Governance,"
Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
- Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1995. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1741, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," NBER Working Papers 5554, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sacha Kapoor, 2020. "Inefficient incentives and nonprice allocations: Experimental evidence from big‐box restaurants," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 401-419, April.
- Hsiao, Cheng & Nugent, Jeffrey & Perrigne, Isabelle & Qiu, Jicheng, 1998. "Shares versus Residual Claimant Contracts: The Case of Chinese TVEs," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 317-337, June.
- Dessein, Wouter, 2012. "Incomplete Contracts and Firm Boundaries: New Directions," CEPR Discussion Papers 9019, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
More about this item
JEL classification:
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
- L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BEC-2006-11-04 (Business Economics)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bef:lsbest:033. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: . General contact details of provider: .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: XXX (email available below). General contact details of provider: .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.