Status and incentives: A critical survey
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More about this item
Keywords
Status; incentives; principal–agent problem;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2014-08-09 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-HRM-2014-08-09 (Human Capital and Human Resource Management)
Statistics
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