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Organizing for Synergies

Author

Listed:
  • Gertner, Robert
  • Garicano, Luis
  • Dessein, Wouter

Abstract

Multi-product firms create value by integrating functional activities such as manufacturing across business units. This integration often requires making functional managers responsible for implementing standardization, thereby limiting business-unit managers? authority. Realizing synergies then involves a tradeoff between motivation and coordination. Motivating managers requires narrowly-focused incentives around their area of responsibility. Functional managers become biased toward excessive standardization and business-unit managers may misrepresent local market information to limit standardization. As a result, integration may be value-destroying when motivation is sufficiently important. Providing functional managers only with "dotted-line control" (where business-unit managers can block standardization) has limited ability to improve the tradeoff.

Suggested Citation

  • Gertner, Robert & Garicano, Luis & Dessein, Wouter, 2007. "Organizing for Synergies," CEPR Discussion Papers 6019, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6019
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Communication; Coordination; Incentives; Incomplete contracts; Merger implementation; Organizational design; Scope of the firm; Task allocation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior

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