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Managerial overload and organization design

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  • Spiegel, Yossi

Abstract

This paper considers a firm's choice between a "divisional structure" and a "functional structure." It shows that an increase in the number of projects which the firm can adopt creates a managerial overload, which favors the divisional structure.

Suggested Citation

  • Spiegel, Yossi, 2009. "Managerial overload and organization design," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(1), pages 53-55, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:105:y:2009:i:1:p:53-55
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Alfred D. Chandler, 1969. "Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the American Industrial Enterprise," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262530090, December.
    7. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1982. "Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives," NBER Chapters, in: The Economics of Information and Uncertainty, pages 107-140, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Emilie Dargaud & Armel Jacques, 2020. "Slowdown antitrust investigations by decentralization," Working Papers halshs-02613352, HAL.
    2. Emilie Dargaud & Armel Jacques, 2015. "Hidden collusion by decentralization: firm organization and antitrust policy," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 114(2), pages 153-176, March.
    3. Laurens Cherchye & Thomas Demuynck & Bram Rock & Kristof Witte, 2014. "Non‐parametric Analysis of Multi‐output Production with Joint Inputs," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 124(577), pages 735-775, June.

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