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The inevitability and irreversibility of organizational uncontrollability

Author

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  • Hugh Mandele

    (Tilburg University)

  • Arjen Witteloostuijn

    (Tilburg University
    Antwerp Management School)

Abstract

In this paper, a classic and seminal contribution of Williamson (J Polit Econ 75:123–138, 1967), “Hierarchical control and optimum firm size”, is revisited so as to remove two of its restrictive assumptions. The introduction of the dynamics of the quality of vertical communication into Williamson’s static model and the development of a simulation to analyze these dynamics provide the opportunity to demonstrate the plausibility of a new conjecture: in each and every hierarchically structured organization, irreversible organizational uncontrollability is ultimately bound to arise, even in a completely stable environment. This is our main contribution. Moreover, we demonstrate that this conjecture is also valid for non-hierarchically structured organizations.

Suggested Citation

  • Hugh Mandele & Arjen Witteloostuijn, 2015. "The inevitability and irreversibility of organizational uncontrollability," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 21(4), pages 380-405, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:comaot:v:21:y:2015:i:4:d:10.1007_s10588-015-9190-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s10588-015-9190-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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