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Information, Authority, and Corporate Hierarchies

Author

Listed:
  • Chongwoo Choe
  • In-Uck Park

Abstract

In a typical corporate hierarchy, the manager is delegated the authority to make strategic decisions, and to contract with other employees. By studying a model with one principal and two agents where one agent can gather information that is valuable for the principal's project choice and the other agent provides effort to the chosen project, we study when the principal can benefit from such delegation relative to centralization. We show that beneficial delegation is possible when complete contracts cannot be written, and delegation of authority should necessarily be to the information gatherer. The benefits of delegation stem from either efficiency gains or reduction in rent to the information gatherer.

Suggested Citation

  • Chongwoo Choe & In-Uck Park, 2010. "Information, Authority, and Corporate Hierarchies," Monash Economics Working Papers 03-10, Monash University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:mos:moswps:2010-03
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    File URL: http://www.buseco.monash.edu.au/eco/research/papers/2010/0310informationchoepark.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Holger Strulik & Klaus Prettner & Alexia Prskawetz, 2013. "The past and future of knowledge-based growth," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 411-437, December.
    2. repec:wly:econjl:v:126:y:2016:i:598:p:2292-2323 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Chih-Hai Yang & Chia-Hui Huang, 2013. "Is Taiwan's R&D productivity in decline? A microeconometric analysis," Journal of Business Economics and Management, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(1), pages 137-155, February.
    4. John Foster, 2014. "Energy, knowledge and economic growth," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 209-238, April.
    5. DAVIS Colin & HASHIMOTO Ken-ichi, 2012. "R&D Subsidies International Knowledge Dispersionand Fully Endogenous Productivity Growth," ESRI Discussion paper series 288, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI).
    6. Colin Davis & Ken-Ichi Hashimoto, 2015. "Industry Concentration, Knowledge Diffusion and Economic Growth Without Scale Effects," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 82(328), pages 769-789, October.
    7. David I. Stern and Astrid Kander, 2012. "The Role of Energy in the Industrial Revolution and Modern Economic Growth," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3).
    8. Holger Strulik, 2012. "From Worship to Worldly Pleasures: Secularization and Long-Run Economic Growth," Courant Research Centre: Poverty, Equity and Growth - Discussion Papers 116, Courant Research Centre PEG.
    9. repec:eee:anture:v:69:y:2018:i:c:p:42-52 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Banerjee, Rajabrata & Roy, Saikat Sinha, 2014. "Human capital, technological progress and trade: What explains India's long run growth?," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 15-31.
    11. Carl‐Johan Dalgaard & Holger Strulik, 2016. "Physiology and Development: Why the West is Taller Than the Rest," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 126(598), pages 2292-2323, December.
    12. Finn Martensen, 2013. "Globalization, Unemployment, and Product Cycles: Short- and Long-Run Effects," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2013-16, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate hierarchies; information gathering; delegation; centralization;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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