Report NEP-CTA-2010-09-18This is the archive for NEP-CTA, a report on new working papers in the area of Contract Theory & Applications. Simona Fabrizi issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.
The following items were announced in this report:
- Chongwoo Choe & In-Uck Park, 2010. "Information, Authority, and Corporate Hierarchies," Monash Economics Working Papers 03-10, Monash University, Department of Economics.
- Berliant, Marcus & Yu, Chia-Ming, 2009. "Locational signaling and agglomeration," MPRA Paper 24799, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Kovenock, Dan & Morath, Florian & Münster, Johannes, 2010. "Information sharing in contests," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 334, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- A. Fedele & A. Mantovani, 2010. "The Importance of Being Consulted," Working Papers 712, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Incentives in Hedge Funds," CARF F-Series CARF-F-205, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Addison, John T. & Altemeyer-Bartscher, Martin & Kuhn, Thomas, 2010. "The Dilemma of Delegating Search: Budgeting in Public Employment Services," IZA Discussion Papers 5170, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Stephen Eliot Hansen, 2010. "The benefits of limited feedback in organizations," Economics Working Papers 1232, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Rupayan Pal & Bibhas Saha, 2010. "Entry Threats and Inefficiency in â€˜Efficient Bargainingâ€™," Working Papers id:2833, eSocialSciences.
- Songzi Du & Yair Livne, 2010. "Chaos and Unraveling in Matching Markets," Papers 1009.0769, arXiv.org.
- Brown, Alessio J. G. & Merkl, Christian & Snower, Dennis J., 2010. "An Incentive Theory of Matching," Open Access Publications from Kiel Institute for the World Economy 37391, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).