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The Importance of Being Consulted

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  • A. Fedele
  • A. Mantovani

Abstract

Does management consulting facilitate the access to credit for start-ups? This paper tries to answer the question by developing a theoretical framework where a firm applies for a bank loan to implement a risky project. The probability of success increases if the firm exerts a costly managerial extra-effort, but the bank is unable to observe such an effort: a moral hazard problem may therefore occur. During an economic downturn the project s expected profitability is likely to be low relatively to the effort cost. In this case we find that credit is granted only if the bank hires a management consultant, even when the latter does not improve the business practice.

Suggested Citation

  • A. Fedele & A. Mantovani, 2010. "The Importance of Being Consulted," Working Papers 712, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    • Handle: RePEc:bol:bodewp:712
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • M11 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Production Management
    • M13 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - New Firms; Startups
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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