Decentralization of contracts with interim sidecontracting
This paper gives a new explanation for the phenomena of subcontracting. A model in which a principal contracts two agents who work in a sequence on a project, have soft information and can collude is considered. Side-contracts between agents can be signed at any stage of the game. Due to limited liability and moral hazard agents obtain a rent. The principalâ€™s problem is to find the preferable contracting structure. It is shown that in this setting a decentralized contracting structure can be superior to a centralized structure for the principal. The paper derives the conditions under which this holds. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D23, D82, L14, L22. Keywords: Contract delegation, Collusion, Interim side-contracting, Moral hazard.
|Date of creation:||2011|
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